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In many two-sided markets, each side has incomplete information about the other but has an opportunity to learn (some)
relevant information before final matches are made. For instance, clients seeking workers to perform tasks often conduct
interviews that require the workers to perform some tasks and thereby provide information to both sides. The perfor-
mance of a worker in such an interview/assessment – and hence the information revealed – depends both on the inherent
characteristics of the worker and the task and also on the actions taken by the worker (e.g. the effort expended); thus there
is both adverse selection (on both sides) and moral hazard (on one side). When interactions are ongoing, incentives for
workers to expend effort in the current assessment can be provided by the payment rule used and also by the matching rule
that assesses and determines the tasks to which the worker is assigned in the future; thus workers have career concerns.
We derive mechanisms – payment, assessment and matching rules – that lead to final matchings that are stable in the
long run and achieve close to the optimal performance (profit or social welfare maximizing) in equilibrium (unique) thus
mitigating both adverse selection and moral hazard (in many settings).
Key words: Matching, Mechanism Design
Subject classifications: Games- Non-cooperative, Repeated, Stochastic
Area of review: Games, Information and Networks
1. Introduction
Motivation.
The seminal work of Holmstro¨m (1999) analyzes how the career concerns of an individual, i.e. the incen-
tives to influence the current behavior of the individual and the ability of the future employers to learn
about him/her and hence, the individual’s future rewards, represent a significant force to explain the behav-
iors observed in many market environments. These career concerns also arise in many two-sided match-
ing settings. For instance, in job recruitment markets, the workers desire to be matched with the clients,
in industries, the managers desire to be matched with tasks/divisions, and in medical school internships,
the medical students desire to get internships. In these setups, the workers have career concerns as their
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performance plays a significant role in determining their matches/position in the future. Both sides are self-
interested and do not have sufficient information about the other, i.e. they do not know each other’s intrinsic
characteristics; thus there is adverse selection. Moreover, after a match is made the subsequent interaction
allows each side to learn about the other. The interactions between the two sides are repeated in nature,
and the learning influences the future matchings and interactions. The learning during each interaction also
depends on the actions taken by the two sides (e.g. the effort exerted by the workers during the interview,
or the effort exerted by the managers on the tasks.), which are not directly observed, in addition to their
unobserved intrinsic characteristics. There can be many possible ways to organize the interactions, i.e. the
assessments and matchings over time. For instance, in job recruitments, the management needs to decide
how to organize the interviews and how to set the payment contracts for different tasks, in crowdsourcing,
the platform (such as Upwork) decides the assessment-matching rule and can prescribe payment rules for
different tasks. Despite the ubiquitous nature of settings with repeated assessments and matching, there is
no systematic theory that models these environments and characterizes the optimal mechanisms that lead to
desirable matchings.
In this work, we develop a systematic theory that captures the important forces common to many environ-
ments with repeated assessments and matching. We characterize mechanisms that lead to stable matchings
and also effectively mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection. Our work sheds light on the efficacy of the
mechanisms that exist in practice and also provide guidelines for the design of the mechanisms to be used
in the future (The design of matching mechanisms for crowdsourcing platforms such as Upwork seems a
particularly fruitful application.).
Setup and challenges. There are two sides: the worker side and the client side. The interaction between
the clients and the workers over different time slots depends on how the assessment and matching is carried
out over time and how the payments are made to the workers (each client has one task and we will use
the words clients and tasks interchangeably based on the context henceforth). The productivity of a worker
for a given task measures the speed with which a worker can complete one unit of the task. Hence, high
productivity workers generate higher revenues. The productivity of a worker when executing a task depends
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on both the worker and the task that it performs. In addition, the workers are self-interested: they decide
the effort level which they will exert on the task, where the effort level is measured as the time spent on the
task. The effort is not observed by anyone but the worker exerting it. The clients offer tasks that differ in
quality, where high-quality tasks generate higher revenues. The planner (for instance, the management in
the firm) decides what mechanism to implement. The mechanism comprises of assessment-matching rules:
that repeatedly assess and match workers with tasks and payment rules: that specify the clients how to pay
the workers. Our objective is to characterize the mechanisms that can lead to optimal long-run performance
while considering the challenges described below. We will consider two possible performance objectives,
total long-run profit and social welfare (total long-run revenue). If the planner is the firm, then total profit is a
suitable objective and if the planner is a crowdsourcing platform, then social welfare is a suitable objective.
1. Incomplete information: The productivity of the worker and the cost for exerting effort depend on
the intrinsic characteristics of the worker and the quality of the task, which are not known in many
situations. Thus there is adverse selection on both sides.
2. Incentives for the clients and workers: The workers decide the effort to exert on a task; the effort
cannot be observed by the clients. Thus there is moral hazard. The workers aim to maximize their
long-run utilities, i.e., the net of the payments received upon the execution of the tasks and the costs
for the effort exerted. The clients aim to maximize their long-run utilities, i.e. the net of the revenues
generated upon the execution of the tasks and the payments made to the workers. The mechanism
includes both an assessment-matching rule and a payment rule. The design of the mechanism must
take into account the incentives of workers and clients.
3. Stability of matching: We require that the matching of workers and clients be stable in the long-run.
This requires extending the familiar notions of stability (Gale and Shapley 1962), (Liu et al. 2014),
(Bikhchandani 2014) to our environment which involves both incomplete information and learning.
4. Privacy: We require that the mechanism respects privacy. In this setting, this means that the worker
histories are not revealed to other workers or unconcerned clients.
Mechanism overview and key contributions.
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Solving for the optimal mechanism in this complicated environment seems impossible. We content our-
selves with constructing a very good mechanism, i.e. a mechanism that performs close to optimal in a
wide-range of settings, satisfies the incentives of the workers and clients, achieves long-run stability and
respects the privacy of the workers.
The proposed payment rule used by the clients to pay the workers has two properties: the payment is
strictly convex and increasing in the output produced, i.e. the marginal benefit of an extra unit of output
increases in the output value, and it is linearly increasing in the quality of the task offered by the client.
If the workers and clients choose to participate in the mechanism, then they need to follow the proposed
payment rule. The assessment-matching rule operates in three phases. In the first phase, referred to as the
assessment phase, the aim is to assess the workers over the different tasks (in different time-slots). In this
phase, the workers also assess the different tasks as they estimate their own utilities from these tasks. In the
next phase, referred to as the reporting phase, the planner requests the workers to submit their preference
lists for the tasks. The planner computes the preference lists for the clients by ranking the workers based on
their outputs for each client. The aim of the third phase, referred to as the operational phase, is to use the
preferences from the second phase and combine them to arrive at the final matches. The planner uses these
preference lists and executes the Gale-Shapley (G-S) algorithm (Gale and Shapley 1962) with the workers
as proposers to output the final matching, which remains fixed for the rest of the interaction.
Before describing the properties of the proposed mechanism, we discuss the insights provided by the
structure of the above mechanism. The structure of the proposed mechanism is natural. We contrast its struc-
ture with some of the existing mechanisms. In job recruitments, it is common that the workers interview
for various divisions at the firm and then submit a preference list. This process is similar to the assessment
phase and the reporting phase in the proposed mechanism. In industrial organization, job rotation (Ortega
2001) is carried out to assess the abilities of the workers before finally assigning them to tasks. The mech-
anisms for job rotation have an assessment phase and an operational phase but there is no reporting phase.
In crowdsourcing, platforms such as Upwork , the matching is carried out based on the initial beliefs which
both sides possess. The proposed mechanism suggests that these platforms would benefit by having a short
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assessment phase followed by reporting and operational phases (it is also possible to repeat the three phases
periodically to adjust for changing workers and clients).
The proposed mechanism induces a repeated endogenous assessment-matching game between the work-
ers and the clients. In the induced repeated endogenous assessment-matching game, the strategy for the
workers consists of the decision to participate or not, the level of effort to exert in the assessment phase,
the preference list that is submitted in the reporting phase, and the level of effort to exert once the worker is
hired in the operational phase. For the clients the strategy consists of the decision to participate or not only.
We derive an equilibrium strategy in which all the workers and clients choose to participate in the mecha-
nism. Each worker exerts maximum effort on all the tasks in the assessment phase. In the reporting phase,
each worker submits a truthful ranking of the clients, which is the ranking of estimates of the long-term
utilities that a worker expects from the clients. In the operational phase, if the worker is assigned to a client
that is sufficiently high on its preference list, then the worker continues to exert maximum effort, else the
worker chooses zero effort for all the future slots.
For a wide range of settings, we show that the repeated endogenous assessment-matching game has a
unique equilibrium payoff, which is achieved by the proposed equilibrium strategy. Moreover, we prove
that both moral hazard and adverse selection are effectively mitigated. Specifically, we show that in many
settings the total long-run revenue (total long-run profit) is close to the maximum total long-run revenue
(total long-run profit) generated when the clients and workers are obedient (no moral hazard) and there is
complete information (no adverse selection). In some settings, we also show that the proposed mechanism
is exactly optimal.
Besides efficiency, we also need to investigate the stability of the matches, i.e. that the workers and clients
do not want to switch (Upwork recently changed its fee structure to discourage workers from switching
jobs and continue working on ongoing tasks1 and thereby encourage stability). We propose a new definition
of stability, long-run stability, which extends the standard definitions of stability such as Gale and Shapley
(1962), Shapley and Shubik (1971), Liu et al. (2014), Bikhchandani (2014), to our setting in which there
is incomplete information and learning. We prove that the matching achieved by the equilibrium strategy
computed for the proposed mechanism is long-run stable (in a wide-range of settings).
Ahuja and van der Schaar: Dynamic Assessments, Matching and Allocation of Tasks
6 00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000
Prior Work. There are several ways to categorize works in the area of matching: matching with or
without transfers, matching with complete or incomplete information (with or without learning), matching
with self-interested or obedient participants, matching in the presence/absence of moral hazard and adverse
selection. We do not describe the works in these categories separately, instead we first broadly position our
work with respect to the existing works and then describe the works that are closest to us. However, in Table
1 in the Appendix we give a summary of representative works in the different categories.
In many real matching setups, the presence of incomplete information is natural, for instance in labor
markets and marriage markets the two sides to be matched do not know each other’s characteristics. How-
ever, in these markets when the entities on the two sides are matched to interact (worker producing output
for the clients in labor markets, interaction during dating in marriage markets), they use the observations
made in the interaction to learn about each other. The observations made often depend both on the char-
acteristics and on the actions (effort in the worker-client setting) taken strategically during the interaction,
which makes learning the characteristics separately non-trivial. The interaction of such a learning process
(obscured by actions) and its impact on the matching has not been studied in the existing works. More
specifically from Table 1, we can see that this is the first work that incorporates different dimensions- match-
ing of self-interested workers and clients (involving transfers) in the presence of incomplete information
with learning (obscured by actions). Next, we describe the works that are closest to this work.
Our previous works, Xiao et al. (2016), van der Schaar et al. (2016), have studied matching settings where
both the costly effort (moral hazard) and unknown types (adverse selection) play a major role. In Xiao et al.
(2016), the workers are assumed to be bounded-rational as they optimize a proxy version of their utility
as defined by the conjecture function, while in the present work the workers are rational, foresighted and
maximize their long-run utilities. In Xiao et al. (2016), van der Schaar et al. (2016), the model assumes
there is adverse selection only on the client side; it is assumed that each worker knows its productivity
across different tasks. In Xiao et al. (2016), van der Schaar et al. (2016), there is no learning of the workers’
and tasks’ characteristics (along the equilibrium path). The model proposed in Xiao et al. (2016), van der
Schaar et al. (2016) only applies to environments where the productivity of the worker does not vary across
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the tasks. In comparison, the model in this current work is more general and applies to general matching
environments where the tasks can be heterogeneous and is more practical. In Xiao et al. (2016), van der
Schaar et al. (2016), the equilibrium matching need not necessarily be efficient: no provable guarantees with
regard to mitigation of moral hazard and adverse selection are given. Also, in Xiao et al. (2016), van der
Schaar et al. (2016), the output produced by the workers is assumed to be a deterministic function of their
productivity and effort. However, in real settings the output can be impacted by other unknown factors and
we address this issue by extending the definition of output to be a stochastic function of the productivity
and the effort. This makes the learning about the workers’ productivities more complex as well. Next, we
proceed to the model and problem formulation.
2. Repeated assessment-matching mechanism design
In this section, we first describe the model and problem formulation. We discuss variations of the model in
Section 3. We will useA to represent a matrix,A(i, j) for an element of the matrix, a to represent a vector,
a(i) for the ith element of the vector, A to represent a set, and a/A to represent a scalar.
2.1. Model and Problem Formulation
There is one planner, N clients and N workers who desire to be matched 2. We consider a discrete time
infinite horizon model. We write each discrete time slot as t ∈ {0,1, ...,∞}. Each client has one task that
it wants to be repeatedly executed in each time slot. The clients and workers are assumed to be rational.
In each time slot, the clients and workers are assessed and matched according to the assessment-matching
rule explained later. We assume that in each time slot one worker can be matched to at most one client and
vice-versa (one-to-one matchings).
Quality distribution of the tasks. We define the set of tasks as S = {1, ..,N}. Each task has an associ-
ated quality level that represents the revenue generated per unit of the task completed. g : S → [gmin, gmax]
maps each task to its quality level of the task, where gmax ≥ gmin > 0. We assume that g is a strictly
increasing function without loss of generality. We assume that the qualities of the tasks are known to the
corresponding clients and the planner only.
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Productivity distribution of the workers. We define the set of N workers as N = {1, ...,N}. Each
worker i’s productivity is a measure of it’s skill level; it is the number of units of task a worker can complete
per unit time. The productivity depends on both the worker and the type of the task that it performs. F :
N ×S → [fmin, fmax] is a mapping from every combination of worker and task to a productivity level. We
assume that no two workers have the same productivity for a particular task x, i.e. F (i, x) = F (k,x) =⇒
i= k . We assume that the productivity of the worker in performing a task is not known to anyone (both the
client and the worker itself) thus, there is incomplete information on both sides. This is a realistic assumption
because in many settings clients do not have enough information about the workers and the workers do not
know how much output they can produce on a task as they may have never done it before (In Upwork, 96%
of the workers have no significant experience Tran-Thanh et al. (2014)).
Efforts and outputs of the workers. Each worker i decides (strategically) how much effort ei to exert
(time invested in working) on a task x, which is assigned to it in a particular time slot. We assume
that ei ∈ Eix = {0, δ,2δ, ..emaxix } and each worker i privately knows Eix. The maximum efforts emaxix ∈
[emaxl , e
max
u ], ∀i ∈ N , ∀x ∈ S. The output produced, i.e. the total number of units of task x completed, is
given as F (i, x)ei (speed of executing the task times the time spent working on it). The effort exerted by
a worker is only known privately to the worker and not observed by anyone else. The revenue generated
is given as [F (i, x)ei]g(x) (number of units of task completed times the revenue per unit of the task). We
assume that the output produced and the revenue generated is observed by the client and the planner. The
assumption that the output produced is the multiplication of the productivity and the effort is a natural one
(See, for instance, Holmstro¨m (1999)). In this section, we assume that the output is a deterministic function
of the quality and the effort, while in some cases the output is a stochastic function of the quality and the
effort (Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). We discuss these extensions in Section 3.1.
We define a cost function C : S ×N → [0,∞). It costs worker i C(i, x)e2i to exert effort ei on task x,
where C(i, x) ∈ [cmin, cmax], ∀i ∈ N ,∀x ∈ S. The assumption that the cost function is quadratic is made
here for simplifying the presentation while the model and results extend to more general cost functions.
We assume that worker i does not know its own costs C(i, x), ∀x ∈ S and no one else knows it as well. If
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worker i is matched to a task x, then the worker observes the cost C(i, x)e2i and thus learns C(i, x). Also,
we define a constant Wmax = fmax [maxi∈N ,x∈S{emaxix }], which denotes the maximum output across all
the workers. We assume that Wmax is known to the planner.
Next, we will define the two main components that are a part of the planner’s design problem: the
assessment-matching rule and the payment rule.
Set of assessment-matching rules. We first define the set of assessment-matching rules and later we will
describe the specific proposed assessment-matching rule that is chosen by the planner from this set. The
planner makes its choice of assessment-matching rule public. If the workers and clients decide to participate
in the mechanism, then they are required to follow the assessment-matching rule. We first define a general
vector of observations made by the planner up to time t− 1 (end of time slot t− 1) as ht0. The elements of
this general observation vector consist of the output histories of the workers, the reports sent by the workers
to the planner. The reports sent by the worker to the planner are assumed to be kept private between the
concerned parties. Note that this is a general observation vector and the observation vector of mechanisms
that only rely on the outputs of the workers (van der Schaar et al. 2016), (Ortega 2001) are a special case of
this. In our proposed mechanism, the observation vector will consist of the outputs of the workers and the
reports containing the preferences of the workers over the clients. We will describe the observation vector
ht0 for our proposed mechanism later in detail.
We denote the set of all the possible histories up to time t asHt0 and the set of all the possible histories as
H0 =∪∞t=0Ht0. A general assessment-matching rule is given asm :H0→Π(S), where Π(S) is the set of all
possible permutations of S. The assessment-matching rule maps each history of observations ht0 to a vector
of tasks. m(ht0)[i] denotes the i
th element of the vector m(ht0) and corresponds to the task assigned to
worker i following history ht0. We restrict ourselves to assessment-matching rules that satisfy the following
condition: limt→∞m(h
t
0) exists for all possible sets of histories {ht0}∞t=1. Put differently: the matching is
eventually constant (although the final matching depends on the paths and also the length of time before the
final matching is achieved can vary). We denote the set of all the possible matching rules that satisfy the
above condition asM.
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Set of general payment rules. We first define the set of general payment rules here and later we will
describe the proposed payment rule that is chosen by the planner as a part of the mechanism. The payment
rules are known to the planner and the concerned clients only. However, the results do not change if the
payment rules are made public as well. If the clients choose to participate in the mechanism, then they need
to follow the payment rules. In each time step, the client needs to pay the workers based on the output
produced in that time slot. The payment rule is given as p : [0,∞)×S →R. p(w,x) is the payment made
by client x to the worker when it produces output w while working on task x. Hence, the payment made by
the client x to the worker are known to the client, the planner and the worker, but the worker does not know
the payment rule. We denote the set of all the possible payment functions as P . Note that we are restricting
to the payment rules that do not change as the clients learn more about the workers, i.e. we do not allow for
renegotiations in the payments based on the learning.
We define the mechanism as the joint choice of assessment-matching rule and the payment rule, which
we denote as Ω = (m, p). Our objective is to determine how the planner should set Ω such that it is aligned
with a desirable objective (for instance, the total long-run revenue) taking the self-interested behavior of the
clients and workers into account. Next, we describe the different components of the strategic interaction.
Strategies of the workers and clients. Each worker and client first need to decide whether or not to
participate in the mechanism Ω. Participation is the only active choice of a client. Next, we define the set
of possible strategies of a worker if it chooses to participate in the mechanism Ω. Later, we will propose
a specific strategy for every worker for the proposed mechanism in detail. Each worker knows the effort it
exerts, while the planner cannot observe the effort of the workers. Each worker also knows the reports that
it makes. In addition, each worker observes the payments made and the costs incurred for exerting effort on
the tasks. Therefore, we have to define the history of observations for each worker separately. We write the
vector of observations of a worker i up to time t as hti, which consists of the efforts exerted, reports sent,
the payments received and the tasks assigned up time slot t− 1 (end of time slot t− 1). In addition, hti also
includes the task assigned in time slot t. We write Hti to denote the set of all possible observation histories
of worker i up to time t. The set of all the possible observations histories up to t=∞ is Hi = ∪∞t=0Hti. We
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Figure 1 Overview of the interactions in the stage game
define the strategy of worker i as a mapping from the history of observations of the worker to the actions,
pii :Hi→Ai, where Ai is the set of actions that a worker takes. An element of the set ai ∈A consist of the
effort to exert and the reports to be sent to the planner. There can be different choices for Ω that impact the
action set differently. If the mechanism operates on the outputs produced by the workers (van der Schaar
et al. 2016), then the component of actions that impacts the payoffs is the effort and not the reports. But if
the mechanism also asks the workers to report their preferences over the tasks, then both the effort and the
preference list over the tasks impact the payoffs. We define the set of all the possible strategies as Π(Ω).
The stage game. In time slot t, worker i is matched to play a stage game with client x = m(ht0)[i]
that we describe next. Each worker decides the amount of effort to exert eti following a private history h
t
i
(pii(h
t
i)[1] = e
t
i, where pii(h
t
i)[1] is the first component of the action vector). We define the output and
the revenue generated by worker i in time slot t for client x as Wi(h
t
0,h
t
i,pii|m) = F (i,m(ht0)[i])eti and
ri(h
t
0,h
t
i,pii|m) = F (i,m(ht0)[i])g
(
m(ht0)[i]
)
eti respectively. The payment made by client x to worker
i for the corresponding output is given as p(Wi(h
t
0,h
t
i,pii|m), x). Therefore, the utility derived by the
worker i in the stage game played in time slot t is computed as follows.
ui(h
t
0,h
t
i,pii|m, p) = p(Wi(ht0,hti,pii|m), x)−C(i, x)(eti)2
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Note that the above utility is quasi-linear (linear in the payments). Similarly, the utility of client x (linear
in the revenue and the payments made) who is matched to worker i in time slot t is given as follows.
vx(h
t
0,h
t
i,pii|m, p) = ri(ht0,hti,pii|m)− p(Wi(ht0,hti,pii|m), x)
See Fig. 1 for an overview of the interaction between a worker and a client in a stage game.
The repeated endogenous assessment-matching game. In every time slot, a stage game is played
between a worker and a client who are matched endogenously based on the observation history of the plan-
ner. We refer to this repeated game as the “repeated endogenous assessment-matching game”. Formally
stated, there are 2N players in the game: N workers and N clients, where a worker-client pair are matched
based onm and the utilities for the stage game are given as described above.
We define the long-run utility for worker i as Ui({pik}Nk=1|m, p) =
limT→∞ 1T+1
∑T
t=0 ui(h
t
0,h
t
i,pii|m, p). We define the long-run utility for client x as Vx({pik}Nk=1|m, p) =
limT→∞ 1T+1
∑T
t=0 vx(h
t
0,h
t
i,pii|m, p). We define the total long-run revenue generated as
R({pik}Nk=1|m) = limT→∞ 1T+1
∑T
t=0
∑N
i=1 ri(h
t
0,h
t
i,pii|m). Finally, we define the total long-run profit
as Pr({pik}Nk=1|m, p) =
∑N
x=1 Vx({pik}Nk=1|m, p). Note that we will only consider the set of mechanisms
and the set of strategies for which all of the above limits exist.
The above game has incomplete information because the workers’ productivities and costs are not known
and thus the workers cannot predict the tasks they are matched to in the future. In games with incomplete
information, the analysis is often simplified by assuming that the distribution of the characteristics is known
even though the exact values of the characteristics are unknown. Using these assumptions the player’s utility
is defined as the expected value over the different realizations of the characteristics of other players. We
do not make such simplifying assumptions in our analysis. However, we will discuss the impact of making
such assumptions on our results.
Knowledge and observation structure. The workers and the clients are rational, independent decision
makers who do not cooperate in decision making and who wish to maximize their long-run utilities. The
total number of time slots in the mechanism and the assessment-matching rules are public knowledge. The
payment rule and the quality of the task are known to the concerned client and the planner. The productivities
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and the costs of exerting effort on a task for the workers are not known to anyone. The effort exerted by
the worker and the corresponding set of effort levels are known to the worker privately. The structure of the
utility (but not the parameters in the utility) of the workers and clients is known to the planner. The output
and the revenue produced by the worker is observed by the concerned client and the planner. The payment
made by the client to the worker are observed by the worker, the client and the planner. The reports sent
by the workers to the planner are kept private between the workers and the planner. The above knowledge
structure is common knowledge.
Objective of the planner’s problem and associated challenges. In this section, we will discuss the
objective of the planner. The planner decides the mechanism Ω = (m, p), the assessment-matching and the
payment rule, to maximize the total long-run revenue or the total long-run profit of the clients subject to
two types of constraints. The first type of constraints are the individual rationality (IR) constraints, which
if satisfied guarantee that the workers and the clients participate in the mechanism. The second type of
constraints are the incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints, which guarantee that every worker follows an
optimal strategy (given the strategies of others). If the strategy of each worker can satisfy the IC constraint,
then the joint strategy of all the workers is an equilibrium (i.e. no worker will want to deviate). We do not
need an IC constraint for the client as the client only needs to decide whether or not to participate (already
accounted for in the IR constraints). Therefore, the planner’s problem is stated as follows:
Planner’s Problem
max
m∈M,p∈P
min
{pik}Nk=1∈Π(Ω)
X({pik}Nk=1|m, p)
s.t. Vx({pik}Nk=1|m, p)≥ 0, ∀x∈ S (IR-clients)
Ui({pik}Nk=1|m, p)≥ 0 ∀i∈N (IR-workers)
Ui(pii,{pik}Nk=1,k 6=i|m, p)≥Ui(pi
′
i,{pik}Nk=1,k 6=i|m, p) ∀i∈N ∀pi
′
i; (IC-workers)
The planner’s goal is to choose a mechanism such that the desired performance objective: the total long-
run revenue or the total long-run profit, i.e. X =R or X = Pr, in the worst possible equilibrium of all the
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possible equilibria is maximized. We can also extend our analysis to the settings where the objective is to
maximize the performance in some equilibrium and not in the worst case equilibrium.
The planner’s problem outlined above is unlikely to be fully solvable due to
• Incomplete information- The planner needs to select m and p to maximize the minimum value of
the long-run revenue achieved by an equilibrium strategy, which depends on both the productivity of
the workers F and the costsC that are not known to the planner. Also, each worker needs to select the
optimal equilibrium strategy, which depends on both the productivity of the workers and the costs of
other workers that are not known to the worker. In our model, the planner and the workers do not even
know the distribution of the workers’ characteristics as is typically assumed in games of incomplete
information to resolve the above challenge.
• Computational intractability- The sets of possible assessment-matching rulesM, the payment rules
P , and the strategies of the workers Π(Ω) is extremely large thus making the problem computationally
intractable. It is even hard to say that there will exist a solution - assessment-matching rule, payment
rule and the strategy of workers - that solve the above optimization problem.
Given the above challenges, it is unlikely that the planner’s problem can be solved exactly. In our
approach, we will solve the planner’s problem approximately. We prove that our solutions are efficient, i.e.
it can achieve high worst case long-run revenue and long-run profit for a wide range of scenarios (Theorem
3), while still satisfying the IR and IC constraints in the design problem. In the next section, we describe
our proposed mechanism.
2.2. Proposed Mechanism and its Properties
First, we give a brief description of the proposed mechanism. The proposed payment rule is designed to be
strictly convex in the output produced by the worker and is linearly increasing in the quality of the task;
the design of payments ensures proportional compensation for the costs of exerting effort. The construction
of the payment rule ensures that if a worker derives positive utility from working on a task, then it is
the best response for the worker to exert maximum effort, thereby completely eliminating moral hazard.
The proposed assessment-matching rule is designed to evaluate each worker on every type of task exactly
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once. Since the worker is evaluated only once we refer to the proposed assessment-matching rule as “first
impression is the last impression” (FILI). Based on the output of the workers a ranking of the workers over
the different tasks is computed and the workers also submit a preference for the tasks to the planner. The
planner computes a final matching based on these rankings and preferences, which remains fixed for all
the future time slots. The planner will announce the FILI assessment-matching rule to all and will privately
inform the clients of their respective payment rules. Next, we give a detailed description of the mechanism,
denoted as ΩF = (mF , pF ).
Payment rule. If worker iworks on task x and producesW (i, x) units of output (units of task completed
by the worker), then the worker is paid pF (W (i, x), x) = αW (i, x)2g(x) by client x, where α is a positive
constant decided by the planner 3 . We require α to be less than 1
2Wmax
to ensure that the clients are willing to
participate in the mechanism (See Proposition 1.). Later, we will discuss how the planner can select α such
that an efficient value for the planner’s objective is achieved. The payment rule is quadratic in the output of
the worker to ensure proportional compensation of the quadratic costs for exerting effort. For more general
cost functions, we can design more general payment rules accordingly. The payment rule incentivizes the
workers to exert high effort as the marginal benefit from producing more output increases. The payment
rule also makes the high-quality tasks more desirable.
Matching rule. The FILI assessment-matching rulemF operates in three phases described below.
1. Assessment phase (0≤ t≤N − 1) In this phase, the matching is carried out with the aim to evaluate
workers’ performances over different tasks. In time slot t, where t ≤ N − 1, worker i is assigned
to task [(t+ i) mod N ], where mod is the modulus operator. Observe that in each time slot all the
workers are matched to different tasks. Also, each worker is matched to every task exactly once in
the first N time slots, i.e. 0≤ t≤N − 1. At the end of each time slot, the worker, the client and the
planner observe the output of the worker on the assigned task. At the end of the t=N − 1 time slot,
the planner must have observed the output of each worker-task combination. We write the observation
of the planner in the form of a matrix W e, where W e(i, x) is the output of worker i on task x in the
assessment phase.
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2. Reporting phase (t=N ) At the start of this phase (start of the time slot t=N ), worker i is matched to
task [(t+ i) mod N ] and the planner requests all the workers to submit their preferences in the form
of ranks (strictly ordered) for tasks. The workers form these preferences based on the task qualities
and the outputs. These rank submissions are a part of the strategy for the workers, which we describe
later4. The planner computes the preferences for the clients over the workers based on the outputsW e
as follows. For every client x, the planner ranks the workers based on the outputs produced on task x
{W e(i, x)}Ni=1. If two workers have the same output, then the tie is broken in favor of the worker that
has a higher index.
3. Operational phase (t ≥ N + 1) In this phase, the final matching is computed based on the assess-
ments in the previous phase and the preferences submitted by the workers. The planner computes the
matching based on the G-S algorithm (Gale and Shapley 1962) as follows. The planner executes the
G-S algorithm with the workers as the proposers and the clients as the acceptors. In each iteration of
the algorithm, each worker proposes to its favorite task that has not already rejected it. Each client
based on the proposals it gets keeps its favorite worker on hold and rejects the rest. At the end of at
most N 2 − 2N + 2 iterations, the matching that is achieved is final. The matching computed above
is fixed for the remaining time slots starting from N + 1. (Note that the N 2 − 2N + 2 iterations are
carried out at the start of time slot N + 1. Moreover, the G-S algorithm is executed by the planner and
there is no direct interaction between the workers and the clients to execute the G-S algorithm.)
A more formal description of the FILI assessment-matching rule is in the Appendix.
Remarks 1. In the above FILI assessment-matching rule, our design involves reporting of preferences
from the worker side. It is important to point out that the above structure will incentivize truthful revelation
(as we will see in the next section). In mechanisms that only operate based on the output and try to achieve
efficient long-run performance, it can be shown that workers can strategically try to under-perform on some
tasks (See Appendix H for details).
2. In the above FILI assessment-matching rule, we use the G-S algorithm because it is a worker-optimal
stable matching procedure (See the definition of worker-optimal stable matching in Roth (1982)). The
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analysis presented in this work extends as long as the matching in the operational phase is based on a
“worker-optimal stable matching” procedure.
3. In the above FILI assessment-matching rule, the planner uses the observation histories from the assess-
ment phase and the preferences collected from the reporting phase to carry out the matching in the opera-
tional phase. However, before these are observed the matching is carried out independently of the observa-
tion history.
Next, we state a proposition which shows that the workers and clients are always willing to participate in
the above mechanism.
PROPOSITION 1. If the payment parameter α≤ 1
2Wmax
, then all the clients and the workers are willing to
participate in the proposed mechanism.
The proofs of all the theorems and propositions are given in the Appendix. See Appendix A for the proof
of Proposition 1. In the rest of the work, we will assume that α ≤ 1/2Wmax. The proposed mechanism
induces a repeated endogenous assessment-matching game as described in Section 2.1. In the next section,
we derive an equilibrium strategy for this repeated endogenous assessment-matching game and also show
that it has some very useful properties.
2.2.1. Equilibrium analysis for the repeated endogenous assessment-matching game. In the previ-
ous section, we described the structure of general strategies induced by the mechanisms inM×P , which
specified workers’ actions as the vector of effort and reports. For our mechanism ΩF , the action of the
workers consist of the effort to exert in the assessment phase and the operational phase, while in the report-
ing phase the actions for the workers consist of both the effort to exert and the preference lists to report.
Next, we will propose a strategy for each worker i, which we refer to as MTBB (M-maximum, T-truthful,
BB-bang-bang) strategy piMTBBi for the following reason. A worker following MTBB exerts maximum
effort in the assessment phase, then reports the preferences truthfully in the reporting phase, and then uses a
bang-bang type structure for exerting effort (maximum or no effort) in the operational phase. We will show
that the MTBB strategy maximizes the long-run utility of the worker.
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1. Assessment phase (0 ≤ t ≤N − 1) In each time slot t in this phase, where t ≤N , worker i should
exert the maximum effort possible, i.e. emax
imF (ht0)[i]
, where mF (ht0)[i] = (t+ i) mod N . In each time
slot, the worker receives a payment from the client it is matched with and also observes the cost for
exerting effort. We denote the payment received by worker i in time slot t as P (i,mF (ht0)[i]) and the
cost incurred by worker i in time slot t as C¯(i,mF (ht0)[i]). At the end of this phase, worker i knows
the P (i, x) and C¯(i, x) for all the tasks x∈ S .
2. Reporting phase (t = N ) In this phase, worker i will first construct the vector of long-run utilities
that the worker expects to derive by being matched as follows, U(i, x) =P (i, x)− C¯(i, x), ∀x ∈ S.
The worker submits a truthful ranking, which is constructed based on the decreasing order of U(i, x).
Worker i exerts maximum effort on task (t+ i) mod N assigned to it in this time slot.
3. Operational phase (t ≥ N + 1) The planner executes the G-S algorithm (as described above) and
assigns to worker i a task y. IfU(i, y)> 0, then the worker exerts maximum effort emaxiy in every time
slot, and otherwise the worker exerts zero effort in every time slot. Note that the ranking list of other
workers and clients is not known to worker i and thus it cannot predict the task it will be matched to
in the operational phase.
The proposed MTBB strategy has a desirably simple structure. Thus, each client will be matched to a
worker who will either exert maximum effort or exert no effort at all, where the former case is good for the
client and in the latter case the client can try to search for some other workers in the future.
In the next theorem, we show that the proposed MTBB is a weakly dominant strategy for each worker.
Therefore, if all the workers follow the MTBB strategy, then the joint strategy will comprise an equilibrium
of the repeated endogenous assessment-matching game (induced by the proposed mechanism ΩF ), which
we refer to as the bang-bang equilibrium (BBE).
THEOREM 1. MTBB strategy and its properties
1. The MTBB strategy is a weakly dominant strategy for each worker.
2. If all the workers follow the MTBB strategy, then the joint strategy is bang-bang equilibrium (BBE).
See Appendix B for the proof of Theorem 1.
Ahuja and van der Schaar: Dynamic Assessments, Matching and Allocation of Tasks
00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000 19
We provide some justification for the above Theorem. Firstly, note that the structure of the mechanism
ensures that if a worker exerts maximum effort on one task, then it does not decrease the chance of getting
accepted by a task that the worker prefers more. Secondly, since we use the G-S algorithm with workers as
proposers, it is always optimal for the workers to truthfully reveal their preferences (Roth 1982). Finally, in
the operational phase, the structure of the payments and costs give rise to the bang-bang structure.
The MTBB strategy is only weakly dominant and thus it does not imply that the bang-bang equilibrium
is the unique NE. However, since bang-bang equilibrium is a dominant equilibrium, its selection is much
more likely than other equilibria (if there are multiple equilibria). In order to play MTBB, the worker does
not need information about the strategy of other workers. In the next section, we establish the conditions
to show the uniqueness of the bang-bang equilibrium. Before that we first make some remarks about the
bang-bang equilibrium.
Remarks 1. In bang-bang equilibrium, we establish that the workers exert maximum effort in the assess-
ment phase. Since the maximum effort level is not known to the clients or the planner, the clients cannot
learn the productivity level of the worker. Even though the maximum effort is known to the worker, the
worker also cannot perfectly learn its productivity, because it only observes the payments (and not the task
qualities and the payment rules).
2. If we consider the case where the workers also have some knowledge in the form of the distribution
of the productivities of other workers, then as well the above theorem continues to hold because the MTBB
strategy is a dominant strategy. Therefore, the bang-bang equilibrium will be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Uniqueness of the equilibrium. In this section, we show that in many cases the repeated endogenous
assessment-matching game has a unique equilibrium payoff (vector of long-run utilities of the workers),
which is achieved by the bang-bang equilibrium strategy. Note that the uniqueness in terms of payoffs
means that there can be multiple equilibrium strategies possible but all of them lead to the same unique
equilibrium payoff. We first state the assumptions under which we can prove that the equilibrium payoff is
unique and is achieved in the bang-bang equilibrium. Before we state the assumptions, we want to clarify
that the planner/clients/workers do not know that these assumptions hold.
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Assumption 1. F (i, x)>F (k,x) ⇐⇒ C(k,x)>C(i, x) ⇐⇒ emaxix > emaxkx , ∀i, k ∈N , ∀x∈ S
Assumption 1 states that if a worker i has a higher productivity than another worker k on a task x, i.e.
F (i, x)>F (k,x), then it has a lower costC(i, x)<C(k,x) for exerting effort on the same task and this is
true for all the tasks x ∈ S and vice-versa. The same condition holds for the maximum effort. Assumption
1 is natural in many settings. It states that if a worker has more experience (and skill) in performing a task,
i.e. (F (i, x) > F (k,x)), then the worker also has more interest in that task and is willing to spend more
time on it, i.e. (C(i, x)<C(k,x)).
Assumption 2. The productivity of a worker is the same across all the tasks, i.e. F (i, x) =F (i, y), ∀x, y
and is thus denoted as F (i). The cost for exerting effort for a worker is the same across all the tasks, i.e.
C(i, x) =C(i, y), ∀x, y and is thus denoted as C(i). The maximum effort for a worker is the same across
all the tasks, i.e. emaxix = e
max
iy , ∀x, y and is denoted as emaxi .
Assumption 2 states that the type of a worker across the different tasks are the same. This is natural in
settings where the tasks are homogeneous, i.e. of the same type. For instance, all the tasks can relate to a
particular language of software development. This assumption requires homogeneity in task types but still
allows the tasks to have different qualities. For instance, different software development tasks can generate
different revenues (qualities). Moreover, the workers can still have different qualities over the tasks even
though the tasks are of the same type.
Before we state the next theorem, where we use the two assumptions stated above, it should be pointed out
that we can even relax Assumption 2 to prove Theorem 2 (See details in the Appendix C). We require this
Assumption 2 for Theorem 3, where we prove efficiency. In the next theorem, we show that if Assumptions
1 and 2 hold, then the repeated endogenous assessment-matching game induced by the proposed mechanism
ΩF has a unique equilibrium payoff and this payoff is achieved by the bang-bang equilibrium strategy.
THEOREM 2. Uniqueness of the equilibrium payoff. If the Assumptions 1, and 2 hold, then the repeated
endogenous assessment-matching game induced by the proposed mechanism ΩF has a unique equilibrium
payoff, which is achieved by the bang-bang equilibrium strategy.
See Appendix C for the proof of Theorem 2.
In the next section, we establish the conditions under which the proposed mechanism can be shown to be
effective in mitigating both moral hazard and adverse selection.
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2.2.2. Effective Mitigation of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. We first state a performance
benchmark that corresponds to an upper bound on the objective, i.e. the long-run revenue achieved, in the
design problem. The performance benchmark corresponds to the maximum total long-run revenue achieved
when the workers are obedient (not self-interested, thus no moral hazard), so they exert maximum effort and
the productivities of the workers are known (no adverse selection). In the next Proposition and in Theorem 3
we will require that Assumption 2 holds. Basically, Assumption 2 is used to arrive at the closed form expres-
sion for both the upper bound on the performance (based on assortative matching) and the performance of
our mechanism, which otherwise is hard to arrive at. The maximum output that can be produced by worker
i (worker i’s productivity is F (i) from Assumption 2) on any task in this scenario is F (i)emaxi . We write
the maximum outputs of workers sorted in the increasing order as follows {F (m1)emaxm1 , ...,F (mN)emaxmN },
where mx is the index of the worker with the xth highest output. We define an indicator function I(A),
which takes the value one if the condition A is true and zero otherwise. We also define a set Smax which
consists of the indices of task x for which the corresponding worker mx is willing to exert maximum effort.
Smax = {x∈ S| αF (mx)2g(x)−C(x)> 0}.
PROPOSITION 2. If Assumption 2 holds, then
• The maximum total long-run revenue generated when the workers are obedient and their productivities
are known is
∑N
x=1F (mx)g(x)e
max
mx
.
• The total long-run revenue generated in the bang-bang equilibrium is∑Nx∈Smax F (mx)g(x)emaxmx
• The total long-run profit generated in the bang-bang equilibrium is
N∑
x∈Smax
(
F (mx)g(x)e
max
mx
)−α(F (mx)emaxmx )2g(x)
See Appendix D for the proof of Proposition 2.
The difference between the performance benchmark and the performance achieved in the bang-bang equi-
librium depends on the proportion of the workers for whom αF (mx)2g(x)−C(mx)≤ 0. Next, we show
some of the possible scenarios where if α is chosen properly, then the difference between the performance
achieved in bang-bang equilibrium and the upper bound is small. Before we proceed to the comparison we
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make a remark about the chosen performance benchmark. The performance benchmark assumes that the
workers are obedient and it can take very high values and thus be a weak upper bound. It is possible to
improve the benchmark by incorporating the self-interested behavior of the workers into the computation,
but arriving at a closed form expression for this is not trivial.
Next, we state the assumption that is needed to make the comparison between bang-bang equilibrium
and the upper bound from Proposition 2. However, in order to state this assumption, we require that the
Assumption 2 holds.
Assumption 3. i) The workers’ productivities are independently drawn from a distribution with cumula-
tive distribution function, which is continuous and is denoted as ∆ : [fmin, fmax]→ [0,1].
ii) The task qualities are independently drawn from a distribution with cumulative distribution function,
which is continuous 5 and is denoted as Γ : [gmin, gmax]→ [0,1].
iii) The maximum cost cmax is bounded above by g
min
emaxu
.
The condition that the maximum cost is bounded above by g
min
emax
ensures that workers can be incen-
tivized to exert high effort while simultaneously ensuring the participation (non-zero profits) of the clients.
Suppose that planner selects α = α∗ = 1
2Wmax
. In the next theorem, we compare the performance (total
long-run revenue and the total long-run profit) of the proposed mechanism (when α = α∗) in the bang-
bang equilibrium with the upper bounds stated in the Proposition 1. We take the expected value of the total
long-run revenue as the measure of performance in the comparison in the next theorem, where the expec-
tation is computed with respect to the distribution of the productivity of the workers. We define a constant
Θ =
emaxl
emaxu
(1−∆(min{√2fmax, fmax}))N .
THEOREM 3. Efficiency of the proposed mechanism. If the Assumptions 1-3 hold and if the planner fixes
α = α∗, then i) the ratio of the expected total long-run revenue in the bang-bang equilibrium and the
expected value of the upper bound (from Proposition 2) is greater than Θ,
ii) the ratio of the expected total long-run profit in the bang-bang equilibrium and the expected value of
the upper bound (from Proposition 2) is greater than Θ/2.
See Appendix E for the proof of Theorem 3.
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If the probability that the productivity of a worker is less than
√
2fmax, i.e. ∆(
√
2fmax), is low , then Θ
is close to one, i.e. the mechanism is close to optimal. The value ∆(
√
2fmax) for a uniform distribution is
[
√
2fmax− fmin]/[fmax− fmin], which is small when fmax is large. In the above theorem setting α= α∗
only requires the planner to know only the maximum output Wmax. However, it is possible to find better
choices of α possibly with more knowledge about the system provided to the planner. In Section 3, we
discuss how the planner can improve the performance by using the knowledge of the distribution of the
types of the workers.
We have already pointed out that the upper bound that we compare to from Proposition 1 can take very
high values and thus can be a loose bound. Therefore, in the next proposition, we compare the performance
of our mechanism with a relatively smaller benchmark. We will restrict ourselves to the set of payment rules
of the form proposed in the mechanism, which pay a worker αw2g(x) for producing w units of output on
task x and are parametrized by α∈ [0, 1
2Wmax
]. We denote this set of payment rules asPF . We do not restrict
the set of assessment-matching rules and it is the same as before given as M. We define two constants
gl =
2cminWmax
(fmax)2
and gu = 2c
maxWmax
(fmin)2
.
Assumption 4. The quality of a task g(x) is either more than gu (high quality task) or less than gl (low
quality task).
The above assumption ensures that if a task’s quality is greater than gu, then every worker wants to exert
non-zero effort on it, else if the task’s quality is lower than gl, then no worker wants to exert effort on it.
PROPOSITION 3. If Assumptions 2 and 4 hold, then the proposed mechanism ΩF achieves the optimal total
long-run revenue among the set of mechanismsM×PF .
See Appendix F for the proof of Proposition 3.
If the planner has the knowledge of the distribution of the worker’s characteristics, then the Proposition
3 can be appropriately extended to expected total long-run profit as well.
In this section in Theorem 3 and Proposition 3, we showed different settings where the proposed mech-
anism is effective in mitigating moral hazard and adverse selection, but we have not compared the perfor-
mance of the proposed mechanism with other mechanisms. In Section 3, we will compare the performance
of the proposed mechanism with some alternative mechanisms.
Ahuja and van der Schaar: Dynamic Assessments, Matching and Allocation of Tasks
24 00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000
2.2.3. Long-run Stability of Matching. In this section, we will establish that our mechanism guaran-
tees that once the clients and workers are matched in the operational phase, they will not need to search
for alternate partners. To be able to capture this condition, we need to propose a definition of stability that
extends the standard definitions to environments where repeated matching is carried out in the presence
of incomplete information and learning (in the presence of moral hazard). The main idea is as follows: if
ex-post in the final matching that is achieved, there is no worker-task pair that is not matched in this final
matching and instead strictly prefers to be matched, then the matching is called “long-run stable”. Next, we
provide the formal definition.
Consider an assessment-matching rule m ∈M and p ∈P . Suppose that worker i uses a strategy pii and
the joint strategy of all the workers is given as pi = {pi1, ...,piN}. The history for planner induced by the
joint strategy pi is denoted as ht,pi0 and the history for worker i induced by the joint strategy pi is given as
ht,pii . The assessment-matching rule will take a limiting value depending upon the history, which we define
asm∗pi = limt→∞m(h
t,pi
0 ). We use the expressions for the long-run utility of worker i and client x=m
∗
pi[i]
as defined in Section 2.1. The expression for the long-run utilities for worker i and client x are simplified
below (See the justification in the Appendix G).
Ui({pik}Nk=1|m, p) = lim
T→∞
1
T + 1
T∑
t=0
p
(
F (i,m∗pi[i])pii(h
t,pi
i ),m
∗
pi[i]
)−C(i,m∗pi[i])pii(ht,pii )2 (1)
Vx({pik}Nk=1|m, p) = lim
T→∞
1
T + 1
T∑
t=0
F (i,m∗pi[i])pii(h
t,pi
i ))g(j)− p
(
F (i,m∗pi[i])pii(h
t,pi
i ),m
∗
pi[i]
)
(2)
The above expression for long-run utility shows that the worker’s utility depends on the task assigned in
the limit and not on the utility derived in the phases before being matched to this task finally.
We now formalize the condition that no worker-task pair that is not matched in m∗pi cannot strictly gain
by being matched to one another. In this formulation, we assume that there are no side-payments, i.e. a
worker cannot try to be matched to a client that it prefers more and offer a side payment from the extra
benefit that it derives and vice-versa, unlike the setup in Shapley and Shubik (1971). Consider worker i and
a task y, where y 6=m∗pi[i], and suppose that this worker-task pair is matched instead of i andm∗pi[i]. In such
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a case, the long-run utilities achieved by worker i and client y (in the limit), when the strategy for worker i
is pi
′
i, is defined below in (3) and (4) respectively. Observe that we are considering the case where worker
i’s final match, i.e. task y, is fixed. Therefore, the strategy of others cannot impact worker i and client y’s
long-run utilities. Hence, it is sufficient to consider the strategy pi
′
i to be a function of time only.
Uˆyi (pi
′
i|p) = lim
T→∞
1
T + 1
T∑
t=0
p
(
F (i, y)pi
′
i(t), y
)
−C(i, y)pi′i(t)2 (3)
Vˆ iy (pi
′
i|p) = lim
T→∞
1
T + 1
T∑
t=0
F (i, y)pi
′
i(t)g(y)− p
(
F (i, y)pi
′
i(t), y
)
(4)
If a mechanism Ω = (m, p) is implemented, then we define long-run stability in terms of the above
expressions for long-run utilities, (1), (2), (3), (4) as follows.
DEFINITION 1. Long-run Stability: An assessment-matching rule m is long-run stable with respect to a
joint strategy pi if there exists no worker-client pair (i, y), not matched in the limit of m (y 6=m∗pi(i)), and
a strategy for worker i pi
′
i that leads to a strict increase in the long-run utility for worker i and client y, i.e.
Uˆyi (pi
′
i|p)>Ui({pik}Nk=1|m, p), Vˆ iy (pi
′
i|p)>Vy({pik}Nk=1|m, p).
The above definition captures the main idea stated at the beginning of this section. If we can show that
the proposed mechanism is implemented and the FILI matching rule is long-run stable with respect to the
bang-bang equilibrium strategy (joint MTBB), then in the final matching that is achieved (in the operational
phase) the workers and clients will not need to switch in search of better partners.
We now compare and contrast the difference of the proposed definition of long-run stability with the
existing definitions. The standard analysis of stability (Gale and Shapley 1962), (Shapley and Shubik 1971)
assume complete information. There also exist definitions of stability (Liu et al. 2014), (Bikhchandani 2014)
for setups with incomplete information. In our setup, there is incomplete information as well because the
preferences are not known to the workers and clients themselves. Unlike Liu et al. (2014),(Bikhchandani
2014), in our setup, the workers and clients interact and learn about each other before finally being matched.
In addition, the preferences in our setup depend on the actions, i.e. the effort exerted by workers, which is
not the case in the standard setups. Our definition ensures that assessments are carried out effectively as it
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checks that in the final matching that is achieved there is no client-worker pair that would instead prefer to
be matched. Moreover, our definition takes into consideration the impact of actions taken after matching
occurs, which is why we define long-run stability with respect to a joint strategy. Next, we prove that the
proposed mechanism is indeed long-run stable with respect to the bang-bang equilibrium.
THEOREM 4. Long-run Stability of Matching. If the proposed mechanism is used and if Assumption 1
holds, then the proposed FILI assessment-matching rule mF is long-run stable with respect to bang-bang
equilibrium strategy.
See Appendix G for the proof of Theorem 4.
We give some insights into a weaker version of the above result. From Gale and Shapley (1962), we know
that the final matching that is achieved is stable with respect to (w.r.t.) the preferences, where the notion of
stability used is the one defined in Gale and Shapley (1962). In our setup, G-S algorithm is used to compute
the final matchings. Therefore, the matching is certainly stable (in the sense of Gale and Shapley (1962))
w.r.t. the stated preferences. In our setup, each worker states its true preferences in the MTBB strategy. Each
client strictly prefers a worker who it expects to generate higher profits. If α≤ 1
2Wmax
, then a worker with
higher output generates a higher profit for the client as long as it is willing to work (exert non-zero effort)
on the task (See the Appendix G for details). In addition, Assumption 1 guarantees that a worker who is
ranked higher on a task should also have a stronger incentive to work on it in comparison to a worker who
has a lower rank. Thus ranking the workers in the order of the outputs reflects the true preferences of the
clients as well. Hence, we can see that the final matching that is achieved is stable (in the sense of Gale and
Shapley (1962)) w.r.t the true preferences. Observe that proving stability (in the sense of Gale and Shapley
(1962)) w.r.t the true preferences does not prove the long-run stability (See Definition 1.), which is why
stated that the above justification only gives insight into a weaker version of Theorem 4.
Our Theorems 4 bears similarity to Theorem 5 in Roth (1989). In Theorem 5 in Roth (1989) it is shown
that if the matching rule is worker-optimal and outputs stable outcomes (stability in the sense of Gale and
Shapley (1962)), then the truthful revelation of preferences is the dominant strategy for all the workers.
Recall that in our setting, the preference list submitted in the MTBB strategy corresponds to the true prefer-
ence list. In Theorem 4, we prove that if the proposed mechanism is used (it uses worker-optimal matching
Ahuja and van der Schaar: Dynamic Assessments, Matching and Allocation of Tasks
00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000 27
in the operational phase), then we know that for every worker MTBB strategy, which leads to the truthful
revelation of preferences, is a dominant strategy and the matching achieved is long-run stable with respect
to bang-bang equilibrium (joint MTBB). In both Roth (1989) and our setting, it is shown that it is possible
to achieve truthful revelation on the worker side and also achieve stability.
Next, we show how some of the simpler mechanisms that do not promote learning in an efficient manner
cannot achieve long-run stability.
Examples when long-run stability is not achieved by other mechanisms.
In this section, our aim is to show that mechanisms that share some similarities with our proposed mech-
anism need not be long-run stable. We describe one such mechanism next.
i) In the first N time slots, each workers works on one task exactly once (similar to the assessment phase
in our mechanism). Each worker’s average output is computed, where the average is taken uniformly across
the tasks that the worker performs. The workers are finally matched to the tasks assortatively as follows.
The worker with the highest average output gets the task with the highest quality and so on. Note that if a
worker’s productivity does not vary across the tasks, then this mechanism can be shown to be the same as
our mechanism provided that it is combined with our proposed payment rule.
We will show that the above mechanism cannot always achieve long-run stability. Consider the following
case with two workers and two tasks. The productivity of the workers, the cost of the workers and the
maximum effort that can be exerted by the workers is given as F =
6 2
5 4
, C =
1 2
1 2
 and, emax = 1
respectively. The productivity of the tasks is given as g = [2 1]. The payment rules for tasks 1 and 2 are
p(x,1) and p(x,2), where it is given that p(x,1) > p(x,2). In this setting, for the mechanism described
above, in the equilibrium the workers will exert maximum effort while being assessed. Finally, worker 1 is
matched to task 2 and worker 2 is matched to task 1, which is not a long-run stable matching with respect to
the equilibrium strategy. On the other hand, the proposed assessment-matching rule will lead to the long-run
stable matching of worker 1 with task 1 and worker 2 with task 2.
There can be other mechanisms that match workers based on the planner’s initial beliefs about the
worker’s types. Such mechanisms also lead to outcomes that are not long-run stable. For instance, if the
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planner’s beliefs about two workers are very similar, then the assignment for such workers is done randomly,
thus leading to unstable outcomes.
3. Extensions and Variations of the Model
3.1. Extension to incorporate knowledge of the distributions
In Section 2, we showed that our mechanism is efficient under certain conditions. In the model in Section
2, the planner has difficulty in comparing performance across different payment rules because it has incom-
plete information about the system. In many real setups, the planner may have knowledge of the distribution
of the workers’ types (Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). Based on this knowledge, the planner can compare
the performance across different payment rules more easily and thus selects payment rules from larger fam-
ilies. In this section, we present numerical simulations to show that if the planner knows the distribution of
the workers characteristics and selects the payments from a larger family of rules (both linear payments:
linear in the output and quadratic payments: quadratic in the output), then the proposed mechanism can lead
to large improvements in performance and can achieve performance close to the optimum. In addition, we
will assume that the workers also have the knowledge of the structure of the payment rule being used (linear
type or quadratic type).
Numerical Simulations. Next, we describe the mechanisms that we will compare against. We assume
that each worker’s productivity and the cost for exerting effort on every task is drawn from distributions
that are known to the planner. The set of payment rules is the union of the following two families- i) Linear
payments: A worker is paid a fixed amount per unit output that it generates. Specifically, a worker is paid
a fraction of the revenue generated, where the fraction is a parameter of the payment rule that needs to be
selected by the designer. ii) Quadratic payments: These payments are the same as the one in our proposed
mechanism (PF ). The client x pays a worker αw2g(x) amount for producing w units of output.
1. Initial belief based matching combined with optimal payment. The planner matches the workers
based on its initial beliefs about the workers as follows. The planner ranks the workers based on the mean of
the beliefs across the tasks and matches the workers with the tasks assortatively, where the tasks are ranked
based on their qualities. If two workers share the same rank, then the matching is done randomly for those
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Figure 2 Comparison of the proposed mechanism with other approaches
workers. Using this as the assessment-matching rule, the planner can select the optimal payment rule from
the above family of payment rules to optimize the chosen performance criterion, which can be the total
long-run revenue or the total long-run profit.
Next, we describe existing mechanisms that are similar to this initial belief based matching combined
with optimal payment. In many existing setups, the assessment-matching rules are similar to initial belief
based matching. For instance, on Upwork the clients and the workers are matched based on their interaction
and there is no mechanism to aggregate the preferences of the clients and workers. Also, the firms that do
not practice job rotation follow a similar mechanism (Ortega 2001) that relies only on the initial beliefs.
The payment rules on platforms such as Upwork generally follow a linear payment structure.
2. Proposed mechanism combined with optimal payment. For our mechanism, we will use the pro-
posed FILI assessment-matching rule mF . We will allow the planner to select the optimal payment rules
from the same family of payment rules described at the beginning of this section (given the fixed choice of
assessment-matching rulemF ).
3. Upper bound on the total long-run revenue and the profit. We use the upper bound for the total
long-run revenue and the total long-run profit from Proposition 2.
In Figure 2, we compare the performance of the proposed mechanism combined with optimal payment
against the mechanisms described above and the upper bound derived in Proposition 2. The details of the
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setup for the numerical simulations can be found in Appendix I. It can be seen that the proposed mechanism
leads to large gains of over 75 percent and is always long-run stable.
In the section to follow, we will discuss the variations of the proposed model for different environments
(with the details given in the Appendix J). Our objective is to show that appropriate variations of the pro-
posed mechanism, which are similar in structure to the proposed mechanism (in Section 2), continue to
perform well and have useful properties (similar to the ones in Section 2).
3.2. Variations of the Model
Stochastic outputs/revenues and costly assessments. In Section 2, the model assumed that the output
produced and thus the revenue generated by the workers was a deterministic function of their productivity
and effort. In realistic settings, the revenue generated is impacted by other uncertain forces as well. First,
we can extend the proposed mechanism and show that results analogous to those presented in Section 2
continue to hold (See the detailed analysis in the Appendix J). In this extension, we either have to make
the assessment phase longer or need to have periodic assessments and thus evaluate each worker multiple
times on a task to have more confidence in the assessments. In some environments, it can be costly to
assess a worker (cost paid to observe the output), for instance, in carrying out interviews or on going
evaluations. Hence, in these setups, long assessment phases are not desirable, and there exists a natural
trade-off between the confidence in the accuracy of the assessments and the costs of assessments. The
planner needs to optimally balance the trade-offs and arrive at the optimal length of the assessment phase
given the costs of assessments. In addition, we can impose constraint that the probability that the final
matching is long-run stable is large. The analysis for such environments with assessment costs can be built
on the analysis that we provide for our proposed mechanism in Section 2.
Other extensions. In some settings, it is more natural to assume that the long-run utilities are discounted
for both the workers and the clients rather than undiscounted long-run averages. Results analogous to those
presented in Section 2 extend to the setup with sufficiently high discounts (See details in the Appendix J). In
this case, though, we will use standard approximate notions of equilibria such as  equilibria to compensate
the loss that may occur in the assessment phase. In other settings, for instance, crowdsourcing platforms,
Ahuja and van der Schaar: Dynamic Assessments, Matching and Allocation of Tasks
00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000 31
it is useful to understand how to extend the mechanism to incorporate dynamic worker/client arrivals/exits.
We provide a brief discussion on how to adapt the mechanism to incorporate worker/client arrivals/exits in
the Appendix J.
4. Conclusion
In this work, we consider an environment with career concerns, where the workers are assessed by differ-
ent clients over time before finally getting matched and then working for a particular client. The mech-
anism considered requires the planner to take actions based on the outputs (stochastic) produced by the
self-interested workers, where the outputs depend on both productivity of workers (unknown thus adverse
selection) and efforts exerted (unobserved thus moral hazard). The workers also do not know their own pro-
ductivities across different tasks (adverse selection). Therefore, the model features both adverse selection
(on both sides) and moral hazard (on one side). We construct a mechanism – assessment, matching and pay-
ment rules – that ensures that both moral hazard and adverse selection thereby achieving high total long-run
revenue (total long-run profits) in a wide-range of settings. We also show that in the proposed mechanism,
the workers find it optimal to follow simple maximum truth bang-bang (MTBB) strategies. We propose a
notion of stability - “long-run stability”, which is meaningful for matching environments with incomplete
information and learning. In a wide-range of settings, we prove that our proposed mechanism can achieve
long-run stability.
Endnotes
1. http://www.forbes.com/sites/elainepofeldt/2016/05/03/freelance-giant-upwork-shakes-up-its-business-
model
2. The entire analysis can be extended to setting when the number of clients and workers are not equal.
3. We choose a quadratic function for payments because the cost for exerting effort is quadratic.
4. In practical settings, not all the tasks on the platform are very different and many of them can be
categorized into one type, for instance, translation (each worker has the same productivity for tasks of the
same type). In such cases, it is sufficient to evaluate the workers on tasks of different types.
5. Since the distribution is continuous, two tasks cannot have the same quality.
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ALGORITHM 1: First impression is the last impression (FILI) assessment-matching rule
for t= 0 to∞ do
if 0≤ t≤N − 1 then
Assessment Phase
for i= 1 to N do
mF (ht0)[i] = [(t+ i) mod N ]
end for
Observe the outputs {W e(i,mF (ht0)[i])}Ni=1
end if
if t=N then
Reporting Phase
Observe the preference lists {bk}Nk=1 submitted by the workers for the tasks
Compute the preference lists for the tasks based on the outputs of the workers
end if
if t≥N + 1 then
Operational Phase
if t=N + 1 then
Use the G-S algorithm with workers as proposers and tasks as acceptors to compute the matching
mGS(W e,{bk}Nk=1)
end if
for i= 1 to N do
mF (ht0)[i] =m
GS(W e,{bk}Nk=1)[i]
end for
end if
end for
APPENDIX
In Table 1, MH stands for Moral Hazard and AS stands for Adverse Selection.
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Matching with Matching with Matching with MH, AS
transfer strategic workers incomplete info.
Gale and Shapley (1962) No No No No, No
Shapley and Shubik (1971) Yes No No No, No
Shimer and Smith (2000) Yes Yes No No, No
Becker (1974), Grossman et.al. (2013)
Roth (1982) No Yes No No, No
Roth (1989), Liu et.al. (2014) No Yes Yes (no learning) No, Yes
Bikhchandani (2014)
Rastegari et.al. (2013), No No Yes (with learning) No, Yes
Lee and Schwarz (2009)
Hopkins (2012) Yes Yes Yes (with learning) No, Yes
Tran-Thanh et.al. (2012) No No Yes (with learning) No, Yes
Ho et.al. (2012) Yes Yes Yes (no learning) Yes, No
Luzarova and Dimitrov (2013) No Yes Yes (with learning) No, Yes
Ashlagi et.al. (2014) No Yes Yes (with learning) No, Yes
Arnosti et.al. (2014) Yes Yes Yes (with learning) No, Yes
Kocer (2014) No Yes Yes (with learning) No, Yes
Karger et.al. (2014) Yes No Yes (with learning) No, Yes
Dayama et.al. (2015) Yes Yes Yes (no learning ) No, No
Fisher (2015) Yes Yes No Yes, No
Xiao et.al. (2016) Yes Bounded rational Yes (learning
(one-step foresight) out of equilibrium) Yes, Yes
Van der Schaar et.al. (2016) Yes Yes Yes (no learning) Yes, Yes
This work Yes Yes Yes (with learning) Yes, Yes
Table EC.1 Comparison of works in the area of matching
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In all the proofs we will use I(A) as the indicator function. If the condition A holds, then the indicator is
one and zero otherwise.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
It is easy to see that the workers can always ensure a zero long-run utility (outside option of the worker
gives zero utility) by exerting zero effort. Therefore, the participation constraint for the workers is trivially
satisfied. If α≤ 1
2Wmax
, then the profit per unit output is always greater than or equal to zero which ensures
that the clients cannot have a negative profit in any period. Thus the clients cannot have a negative long-run
profit.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1.
There are two parts to the Theorem. In the first part, we need to show that the MTBB strategy is a weakly
dominant strategy. First, we will simplify the expression for the long-run utility of the worker i when the
proposed mechanism ΩF = (mF , pF ) is implemented. We write the joint strategy for all the workers as
pi = (pi1, ...,piN). In Section 2, where we defined the strategy of the workers for a given mechanism Ω,
we used a general definition for the action set. The strategy consisted of two parts, pii(hti)[1] is the effort
exerted by worker i and pii(hti)[2] is the reports submitted by the worker. For our proposed mechanism Ω
F ,
the second component of reports only plays a role in time slot N , i.e. the reporting phase, and for the rest
of the time slots the clients can choose to send no reports as it does not impact the interactions in any way.
We write the private history of worker i, which is induced by the joint strategy pi as ht,pii . We write the
preference list provided by worker i in the reporting phase as
bi =pii(h
N,pi
i )[2] (EC.1)
The output produced in time slot t by worker i assigned to task j = (t+ i) mod N is written as
W e(i, j) =F (i, j)pii(h
t,pi
i ) (EC.2)
The G-S algorithm executed by the planner at the beginning of the operational phase takes as input the
preference lists {bi}Ni=1 and the outputs produced by the workers W e. We represent the output of the G-S
algorithm as
mGS({bi}Ni=1,W e) (EC.3)
wheremGS is a function that takes the preference lists and performance of workers as input and outputs the
matching. Note that we do not explicitly write the observation history of the planner ht0. The joint strategy
pi induces an observation history for the planner, which we write as ht,pi0 . Note that h
t,pi
0 and {bi}Ni=1,W e
contain the same relevant information needed for the final matching to be determined by G-S algorithm. For
consistency, we state that when t≥N + 1,
mF (ht,pi0 ) =m
GS({bi}Ni=1,W e) (EC.4)
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is the notation for the proposed assessment-matching rule given in Section 2.
The expression for the long-run utility for worker i defined in Section 2. is simplified by substituting
(EC.4) as follows.
Ui({pik}Nk=1|mF , pF ) =
lim
T→∞
1
T + 1
T∑
t=N+1
[
αF (i,mGS({bk}Nk=1,W e)[i])2g(mGS({bk}Nk=1,W e)[i])−C(i,mGS
({bk}Nk=1,W e[i])](eti)2
(EC.5)
In the above expression (EC.5), eti =pii(h
t,pi
i )[1]. In the above expression (EC.5), we did not write the utility
from the assessment and reporting phase because the number of time slots in assessment phase are finite
N + 1 and thus utilities in the assessment phase do not contribute to the long-run utility.
We define
e¯2i = lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
1
T + 1
(eti)
2 (EC.6)
We define
H i({bk}Nk=1,W e) = αF (i,mGS({bk}Nk=1,W e)[i])2g(mGS({bk}Nk=1,W e)[i])−C(i,mGS
({bk}Nk=1,W e[i])
(EC.7)
Thus we can simplify the above utility (EC.5) by substituting (EC.6), (EC.7) as follows.
Ui({pik}Nk=1|m, p) = e¯2iH i({bk}Nk=1,W e) (EC.8)
Next, we want to solve for the optimal strategy pii given the fixed strategy of the rest of the workers pi−i.
Formally stated, the optimization problem is given as follows.
max
pii
Ui({pik}Nk=1|mF , pF ) (EC.9)
We will first compute an upper bound for (EC.8). Observe that
Ui({pik}Nk=1|m, p) = e¯2iH i({bk}Nk=1,W e)≤ (emaximGS({bk}Nk=1,W e)[i])
2H i({bk}Nk=1,W e)I
(
H i({bk}Nk=1,W e)
)
(EC.10)
In the above expression (EC.10), the LHS will achieve the same value as the RHS provided worker i
follows the following strategy. If t≥N + 1 and H i({bk}Nk=1,W e)≥ 0, then eti = emaximGS({bk}Nk=1,W e)[i] and
eti = 0 zero otherwise. We now compute the optimal value for the maximum for the RHS. The expression
in RHS depends only on the actions taken in the assessment and the reporting phase. Based on the above
inequality (EC.10), we can say that the optimizer of the RHS in terms of the actions in the assessment
and reporting phase will be an upper bound of the maximization problem in (EC.8). We first maximize the
expression in RHS with respect to the choice of preference lists submitted in the reporting phase.
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We claim that if worker i ranks the clients in the order of [αF (i, j)2g(j) −C(i, j)](emaxij )2 for all j,
then it corresponds to the best choice of the preference list. We denote this preference list as b∗i . This claim
follows from Theorem 5 Roth (1982), where it is shown that the truthful reporting is a dominant strategy
when the matching rule is worker optimal and leads to stable outcomes.
Thus we can write
Ui({pik}Nk=1|m, p) =
e¯2iH i({bk}Nk=1,W e)≤ (emaximGS({bk}Nk=1,W e)[i])
2H i({bk}Nk=1,W e)I
(
H i({bk}Nk=1,W e)
)
≤
(emax
imGS({bk}Nk=1,k 6=i,b∗i ,W e)[i]
)2H i(b
∗
i ,{bk}Nk=1,k 6=i,W e)I
(
H i(b
∗
i ,{bk}Nk=1,k 6=i,W e)
) (EC.11)
Next, we will show that if the preference list is fixed for worker i to b∗i , then the choice of effort level for
task j in the assessment phase, which is denoted as eevalij , that maximizes the RHS of the above expression
(EC.11) is emaxij . We do so by arguing that the long-run utility of the worker increases in e
eval
ij .
If the worker increases eevalij to e
eval
ij + δ, then the ranking of the worker by task j can either stay the
same or increase. Since other parameters remain the same, the ranking of worker i on other tasks does not
change. In this case, there are three possibilities. Suppose that the worker exerts effort levels {eevalik }Nk=1
in the assessment phase on different tasks and submits the preference list b∗i in the reporting phase and is
matched to task j1 in the operation phase. We will analyze the behavior of the (EC.11) when we vary the
effort level of worker i on task j eevalij . It is possible that rank of task j1 in the preference list b
∗
i is greater
than task j or equal or lesser. If the rank of j1 is greater than j, then the worker even after increasing effort
on task j will still be accepted by j1 as the ranking of the worker for j1 and ranking of j1 for all workers is
not affected by eevalij . Thus, in this case, increasing the effort e
eval
ij will not change the rank of the task that
is assigned.
If the rank of j1 is equal to j, then by increasing the effort eevalij can only improve worker’s ranking for
task j. The ranking of worker i on tasks ranked higher than task j is still the same, thus worker i will be
rejected by all those tasks. But since the ranking of worker i on task j is the same or higher it means that
the worker will be assigned to j.
If the ranking of task j1 is lesser than the rank of task j, then note that the ranking of the worker on task
j1 will not change and thus the worker will still be accepted by task j1 at least. However, since the worker
increases effort on task j the ranking of the worker can improve on task j. This means that it is possible that
the worker is accepted by a strictly higher ranked task. Thus we know that increasing effort eevalij can lead to
the worker being matched to a task with higher or the same rank as before. A task with higher or the same
rank will imply a higher or the same value for the long-run utility of the worker. Hence, the eevalij = e
max
ij
is the optimal choice at which the upper bound in the RHS is maximized. This holds for all the tasks that
worker i is matched to for the first time in the assessment phase. Observe that the proposed MTBB strategy
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achieves the value for the upper bound in the RHS, thus it has to be the best response for a worker to every
strategy of other workers.
The next part of the theorem follows easily from the fact that since all the workers use their best response
strategies the joint strategy has to be an equilibrium.
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Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 2.
Before we provide the proof, it is important to remind how we define the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Each equilibrium strategy has a corresponding equilibrium payoff. If for the repeated game that we analyze
all the possible equilibrium strategies lead to the same payoff, then we call the equilibrium payoff to be
unique. In this Theorem, we will assume that the Assumption 1 and 2 hold. We can combine the Assumption
1 and 2 and interpret them together as follows.
From Assumption 1 and 2, we can see that the preference list for all the workers in the MTBB strategy is
the same and corresponds to the ranking of the tasks in order of their qualities. Also, if the workers follow
the MTBB strategy, then the ranking of the workers as computed by the planner for every client is the same
as well. Specifically, the ranking of the workers is based on the outputs in the assessment phase, where the
set of outputs in assessment phase is given as {F (k)emaxk }Nk=1. Hence, from now on in this proof when we
refer to the ranking of the tasks it is the same as the ranking done by every worker in the MTBB strategy
unless stated specifically otherwise. Similarly, when we refer to ranking of workers it is the same as the
ranking of the workers based on their maximum outputs computed by planner for every client.
First, we show that there does not exist another equilibrium in which at least one worker i can achieve
a higher utility than the utility achieved in bang-bang equilibrium (i.e. the joint MTBB strategy). If all the
workers play the MTBB strategy, then the matching that is computed at the start of the operational phase
after the execution of G-S algorithm is denoted asmBBE , wheremBBE[i] is the index of the task assigned
to worker i. Suppose that there exists another equilibrium in which worker i can strictly gain. If worker i
strictly gains in this equilibrium in comparison to the utility achieved in the bang-bang equilibrium, then it
has to be matched to a task that is ranked higher than mBBE[i]. Let the task that worker i is assigned to
in the new equilibrium be denoted as mBBE[j]. In this new equilibrium, we claim that at least one of the
workers that were matched to a task ranked greater than or equal tomBBE[j] in the bang-bang equilibrium
will now be matched to a task that is ranked strictly less than its match in the bang-bang equilibrium. Next,
we justify this claim.
Consider the set of the workers who were matched to tasks ranked greater than or equal to mBBE[j]
in the matching achieved in the operational phase in bang-bang equilibrium. Let us denote this set by Z .
Suppose that the number of workers in this set are N1. In the new equilibrium in which i strictly gains,
suppose that every worker in this set is matched to a task that is ranked strictly higher than or equal to its
match in bang-bang equilibrium. First, note that if this supposition is not true, then the claim that there is
atleast one worker matched to a task ranked less than its match in the bang-bang equilibrium is already true.
Next, we assume that the supposition is true and proceed. Since the worker i is matched to mBBE[j], the
workers in Z have to be matched to tasks that are ranked strictly higher thanmBBE[j]. The total number of
tasks that are ranked strictly higher thanmBBE[j] are N1− 1. Therefore, if the supposition were true, then
ec8 e-companion to Ahuja and van der Schaar: Dynamic Assessments, Matching and Allocation of Tasks
N1 workers have to be matched to at most N1 − 1 tasks. Hence, it is not possible to assign each of these
workers to a strictly higher task (From Pigeonhole principle).
Consider the worker that has the highest ranking among all the workers that are assigned to a task that
is ranked lower than their corresponding match in the bang-bang equilibrium. Let this worker be worker k
and let the task assigned to k in the new equilibrium be mBBE[l]. In this new equilibrium, let the worker
who is matched to mBBE[k] be worker r. Note that the rank of worker r has to be lesser than the rank of
worker k. Next, we argue that in this new equilibrium, worker k must have used a strategy different than
MTBB. More specifically, worker k either does not exert maximum effort on at least one task ranked ahead
of mBBE[l] in the assessment phase or ranks mBBE[l] ahead of at least one task that was ranked higher in
the preference list used in the MTBB strategy. Suppose that this is not the case, which means that worker
k exerts maximum effort on all the tasks ahead of mBBE[l] and worker k also ranks all the tasks that were
ahead ofmBBE[l] to be higher thanmBBE[l].
Now since worker k exerts maximum effort on all the tasks ahead of mBBE[l], it will be ranked ahead
of r by mBBE[k] because it has a higher maximum output (rank of k is higher than k in the bang-bang
equilibrium). We also know that worker k ranks mBBE[k] ahead of mBBE[l]. Therefore, the matching
achieved is not stable w.r.t the preferences of the workers and the clients. This is a contradiction as the
matching achieved must be stable as we use the G-S algorithm. Hence, in the new equilibrium, it must be
that the worker must have either not exerted maximum effort on at least one task ranked ahead ofmBBE[l]
in the assessment phase or the preference list that it submits must rank mBBE[l] ahead of at least one task
that was ranked higher in the preference list in the bang-bang equilibrium. Next, we analyze what happens
if worker k instead uses the MTBB strategy in this case.
In this case, worker k will approach all the tasks ranked higher thanmBBE[l] beforemBBE[l]. We claim
that the worker will be accepted by at least one task ranked higher than or equal tomBBE[k]. Suppose that
this is not the case, i.e. no task higher or equal tomBBE[k] accepts k. Observe that in the matching achieved
in the bang-bang equilibrium, the number of tasks that are ranked higher or equal to mBBE[k] is the same
as the number of workers with output greater than or equal to F (k)emaxk . Based on this observation and
the supposition above, it has to be true that at least one of the tasks ranked higher or equal to mBBE[k]
accepts a worker with productivity lower than F (k)emaxk . Let this task be denoted as m
BBE[q]. We also
know thatmBBE[q] is also preferred more by worker k than its current match. Therefore, the matching that
is achieved is not stable. This is a contradiction because the matching achieved by the G-S algorithm has to
be stable. Hence, it must be true that if worker k uses MTBB strategy, then it is accepted by a task that is
ranked at least as high asmBBE[k].
We assume that all the tasks are of distinct qualities. Therefore, αF (k)2g(mBBE[k]) − C(k) >
αF (k)2g(mBBE[l])−C(k). If αF (k)2g(mBBE[k])−C(k)> 0, then worker k will exert maximum effort
in the operational phase and thus deviating to the MTBB strategy will lead to a profitable deviation. This
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is a contradiction as the new equilibrium does not satisfy the incentive compatibility for all the workers.
Therefore, αF (k)2g(mBBE[k])−C(k)≤ 0. In this case, worker k will have no incentive to exert maximum
effort. Thus the deviation cannot be strictly profitable. However, since αF (k)2g(mBBE[k])−C(k)≤ 0 we
can claim in the new equilibrium, worker i will also exert no effort. If this claim is true, then it will imply
that worker i cannot strictly gain in the new equilibrium, which is a contradiction to the original claim that
we can find another equilibrium in which worker i strictly gains. We justify this claim next.
In the new equilibrium, worker i is matched to task mBBE[j]. We know that the rank of mBBE[k] is
greater than or equal tomBBE[j], which implies the following
g(mBBE[k])> g(mBBE[j]) (EC.12)
We also know that the rank of worker k is more than the rank of worker i because in bang-bang equi-
librium worker k is matched to a task that is ranked higher than the task assigned to worker i. Therefore,
F (k)emaxk ≥ F (i)emaxi . From Assumption 1, we can conclude that
F (k)emaxk ≥ F (i)emaxi =⇒ F (k)≥ F (i) =⇒ C(k)≤C(i) (EC.13)
Based on (EC.12) and (EC.13), we have αF (i)2g(mBBE[j])−C(i)≤ 0, which implies that the utility
achieved by worker i is 0. This establishes the claim. Hence, there cannot be another equilibrium in which
a worker gains strictly in comparison to bang-bang equilibrium.
Next, we argue that there cannot be another equilibrium in which at least one worker gets a strictly lower
payoff than in bang-bang equilibrium. We develop the proof for this on the same lines as the above. Note
that for a worker to have strictly lower utility it has to be that the worker is matched to a task that is ranked
strictly lesser than the task the worker is matched to in bang-bang equilibrium. Also, for the worker to have a
strictly lower utility, it has to be true that the worker gets a strictly positive utility from its match in the bang-
bang equilibrium. In this new equilibrium, we define the set of workers who are matched to tasks, which are
strictly less in ranking in comparison to their match in the bang-bang equilibrium. From this set, we choose
the worker with the highest rank. Let us denote this worker by s. Since the worker s has a positive utility
from its match in the bang-bang equilibrium it has to be true that for s, αF (s)2g(mBBE[s])−C(s)> 0.
We can show that this worker s must have used a strategy different than MTBB. The proof of this is exactly
on the same lines as the one for worker k given above. Based on the above proof for worker k it can also
be shown that if worker s instead uses the MTBB strategy, then it will be matched to a task that has at
least the same rank asmBBE[s]. Since αF (s)2g(mBBE[s])−C(s)> this deviation has to be profitable for
worker s. Thus in this new equilibrium, incentive compatibility constraints are not satisfied that leads to a
contradiction. Hence, there will be no equilibrium in which at least one worker gets strictly lower payoff
than the bang-bang equilibrium. We can conclude that in every equilibrium each worker will have the same
payoff as in the bang-bang equilibrium.
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Remark about Assumption 2. In the above proof, we require that every worker has the same ranking
over the tasks and vice-versa. Assumption 2 is a sufficient condition to establish that the rankings are the
same on both sides. Consider the case where Assumption 2 does not hold. However, if the rankings are still
the same on both sides, then Theorem 2 continues to hold.
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Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 2.
We write the set of outputs as follows {F (1)emax1 , ...,F (N)emaxN } and we write the outputs sorted in the
increasing order as follows {F (m1)emaxm1 , ...,F (mN)emaxmN }. Let us first establish the upper bound on the
output. First, we will compute an upper bound on the total revenue that can be generated in one period.
Clearly, the revenue generated is monotonic in the effort exerted by any worker. Since we are computing
the upper bound here we will assume that each worker exerts maximum effort. Each worker i should exert
maximum effort emaxi otherwise the effort can always be increased to improve the output. Consider a general
matchingm′ :N →S, wherem′[i] is the task allocated to worker i.
We can write the total revenue for this matching m
′
as follows
∑N
i=1F (i)e
max
i g(m
′
[i]). The inequality
given below is a consequence of the rearrangement inequality.
N∑
i=1
F (i)emaxi g(m
′
[i])≤
N∑
i=1
F (mi)e
max
i g(i) ,∀M
′
(EC.14)
Therefore, we can also write the following for every matching rule m and joint strategy pi as defined in
Section 2.
N∑
i=1
ri(h
t
0,h
t
i,pii|m)≤
N∑
i=1
F (mi)e
max
mi
g(i)
The above holds true because ri(h
t
0,h
t
i,pii|m) = F (i)g(m(ht0))pii(hti) ≤ F (i)g(m(ht0)[i])emaxi and
m
′
=m(ht0). Note that the upper bound is same for each time slot, the same upper bound continues to hold
for the long-run average too.
Next we compute the output achieved by the proposed mechanism provided all the workers follow
the MTBB strategy. We know that a worker i will exert emaxi in the operational phase if and only if
αF (i)2g(y)− C(i) ≥ 0, where y is the task assigned to worker i the bang-bang equilibrium. Due to the
Assumption 2, the ranking of the workers across different tasks is the same and vice-versa. Since the work-
ers follow MTBB strategy, they are ranked based on their maximum outputs. The clients are ranked in the
order of their qualities. Therefore, client x is matched to worker mx, where worker mx has the xth highest
maximum output. Hence, the total long-run average revenue and the total long-run profit are given as fol-
lows respectively (Note that the contribution from the assessment and reporting phase does not matter for
the computation of the long-run average).
N∑
x=1
F (mx)e
max
mx
g(x)I(αF (mx)
2g(x)−C(x)≥ 0) (EC.15)
N∑
x=1
[F (mx)e
max
mx
g(x)−α(F (mx)emaxmx )2g(x)]I(αF (mx)2g(x)−C(x)≥ 0) (EC.16)
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Appendix E: Proof of Theorem 3.
If there exists a worker i for which αF (i)2g(x)− cmax ≥ 0, then all the workers with quality greater than
F (i) who follow MTBB strategy if assigned to g(x) in the operational phase exert maximum effort.
If we substitute α= α∗ = 1
2Wmax
in αF (i)2g(x)− cmax ≥ 0, then we get the following condition using
Assumption 3. If F (i)2 ≥ 2fmax, then worker i should exert maximum effort irrespective of the task
assigned. We can compute the lower bound on the expected total long-run revenue achieved in the bang-
bang equilibrium as follows.
E
[
N∑
x=1
F (mx)g(x)e
max
mx
I(αF (mx)
2g(i)−C(mx)≥ 0)
]
≥ emaxl E
[
N∑
x=1
F (mx)I(F (mx)≥
√
2fmax)g(x)
]
= emaxl
N∑
x=1
E
[
F (mx)I(F (mx)≥
√
2fmax)
]
E[g(x)]
(EC.17)
In the above expression (EC.17), {F (mx)emaxmx }Nx=1 is the set of ordered values {F (i)emaxi }Ni=1.
We compute the following lower bound for the term inside the summation in (EC.17).
E[F (mx)I(F (mx)≥
√
2fmax)] =E[F (mx)|F (mx)≥
√
2fmax]P (F (mx)≥
√
2fmax)
≥E[F (mx)|F (mx)≥
√
2fmax](1−∆(
√
2fmax))N
(EC.18)
The above expression (EC.18) holds for all x∈ {1, ....,N}. We substitute (EC.18) in (EC.17) to obtain
E
[
N∑
i=1
F (mx)g(x)e
max
mx
I(αF (mx)
2g(x)−C(mx))≥ 0)
]
≥
emaxl (1−∆(
√
2fmax))N
N∑
i=1
E[F (mx)|F (mx)≥
√
2fmax]E[g(x)]
(EC.19)
Similarly, we can get the upper bound long-run output using the expression in (EC.14) given as
N∑
x=1
E[F (mx)]E[g(x)]e
max
u (EC.20)
We take the ratio of the two expressions (EC.19) and (EC.20) to get the final result as follows.
emaxl
emaxu
(1−∆(
√
2fmax))N = Θ (EC.21)
In writing the above expression (EC.21), we use the following observation E[F (i)|F (i) ≥√2fmax] ≥
E[F (i)]. The result for the profit can be derived based on the following observation. The profit for client x
when the worker produces w units of output is given as (1−αw)(wg(x)). Profit in one time slot satisfies
the following condition
(1−αw)(wg(x))≥ (1− w
2Wmax
)≥ 1
2
(wg(x))
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Therefore, from the above condition we have that each client keeps at least half the revenue that it makes.
Hence, the profit that the client makes is atleast half of the revenue. This justifies the ratio of the expected
profit of the proposed mechanism and the upper bound on the profit Θ/2.
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Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 3
First, we derive the optimal long-run revenue for the class of mechanisms inM×PF .
Consider a fixed payment rule with parameter α. We consider assessment-matching rules in which each
worker is finally matched to some client (in the limit) and thereafter there is no change in the matching.
Given the fixed payment rule, it is easy to check that the only incentive compatible choice for worker i’s
effort for task x is
emaxi I(αF (i)
2g(x)−C(i)) (EC.22)
Therefore, if worker i is matched to task x, then the long-run revenue generated by worker i is
F (i)emaxi I(αF (i)
2g(x) − C(i))g(x). Based on this we can write the expression for the maximum total
long-run revenue that can be generated as follows.
max
m˜
N∑
i=1
F (i)emaxi I(αF (i)
2g(m˜[i])−C(i))g(m˜[i]) (EC.23)
Observe that the indicator function in the objective above (EC.23) increases with α. Therefore, the above
maximum value (EC.23) is an increasing function of α. Based on the constraint that α ≤ 1
2Wmax
, we can
conclude the optimal value over all the payment rules in PF is given as
max
m˜
N∑
i=1
F (i)emaxi I(
1
2Wmax
F (i)2g(m˜[i])−C(i))g(m˜[i]) (EC.24)
Next, we simplify the above expression (EC.24). We claim that (EC.24) is simplified as follows.
max
m˜
N∑
i=1
F (i)emaxi I(
1
2Wmax
F (i)2g(m˜[i])−C(i))g(m˜[i]) =
N∑
i=1
F (mi)e
max
mi
I(
1
2Wmax
F (mi)
2g(i)−C(mi))g(i)
(EC.25)
In the above expression (EC.25), {F (mi)emaxmi }Ni=1 corresponds to the set of values {F (i)emaxi }Ni=1
ordered in the increasing order. In the matching in RHS above (EC.25), worker mi is matched to client i.
We denote this matching as mˆ. For consistency, we state that mˆ(mi) = i, ;∀i ∈ {1, ..,N}. Also, note that
the optimal value for α= α∗ = 1
2Wmax
.
Next, we establish the above claim by deriving the RHS in (EC.25).
First, we will establish a property that is a consequence of Assumption 2 and Assumption 4.
If worker i is matched to a task g(y) of quality greater than or equal to g(y) > gu, then it will exert
maximum effort. To prove this we need to show that the value of the indicator function in (EC.22) is always
one when g(y)> gu.
I(
1
2Wmax
F (i)2g(y)−C(i))≥ I( 1
2Wmax
(fmin)2g(y)− cmax ≥ 0)≥ I( 1
2Wmax
(fmin)2gu− cmax ≥ 0) = 1
(EC.26)
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If a worker is matched to a task g(x) of quality greater than or equal to g(x) < gl, then it will exert no
effort. To prove this we need to show that the value of the indicator function in (EC.22) is always zero when
g(x)< gl.
I(
1
2Wmax
F (i)2g(x)−C(i))≤ I( 1
2Wmax
(fmax)2g(x)− cmin ≥ 0)≤ I( 1
2Wmax
(fmax)2gl− cmin ≥ 0) = 0
(EC.27)
Let us assume that there is a m˜∗ different than mˆ, which is optimal and leads to a strictly higher value
for the objective, i.e. the total long-run revenue. We need to consider the following three cases:
Suppose that there exists at least one task that has a quality more than gu. Therefore, we can find a task
denoted as jˆ that satisfies the following condition: g(j) > gu, ∀j ≥ jˆ and g(j) < gl, ∀j ≤ jˆ. For a given
matching m˜, we partition the workers into two sets: workers that are matched to tasks with quality greater
than or equal to g(jˆ) and the tasks with quality lesser than g(jˆ). Let the two sets for the matching mˆ be
denoted as S1 and S2, where S1 is the set of workers matched with tasks of quality greater than or equal to
g(jˆ) and S2 is the set of workers matched with tasks with quality lesser than g(jˆ). Similarly, the two sets
corresponding to the matching m˜∗ be R1 and R2.
Suppose that R1 is not equal to S1. Thus we can conclude that R1 ∩ S2 and R2 ∩ S1 is non-empty.
Consider a worker i1 from the setR1∩S2 and another worker i2 from the setR2∩S1. From the definition of
the matching mˆ, we can conclude that F (i1)emaxi1 <F (i2)e
max
i2
. In the matching m˜∗, worker i1 is matched
to task greater than or equal to g(jˆ) and worker i2 is matched to task less than g(jˆ). Suppose that we swap
the worker i1 and worker i2 in the matching m˜
∗. The worker i2 will now exert maximum effort and worker
i1 will now exert zero effort (This is due to the property that we established above). Since F (i1)emaxi1 <
F (i2)e
max
i2
the total long-run revenue will increase, thus contradicting the fact that m˜∗ is optimal. Therefore,
the supposition that R1 is not equal to S1 cannot be true. So, we know that R1 = S1 and R2 = S2. Next, we
simplify the expressions for the total long-run revenues under m˜∗ and mˆ.
N∑
i=1
F (i)emaxi g(m˜
∗[i]) =
∑
i∈R1
F (i)emaxi g(m˜
∗[i]) (EC.28)
N∑
i=1
F (i)emaxi g(mˆ[i]) =
∑
i∈R1
F (i)emaxi g(mˆ[i]) (EC.29)
Since m˜∗ is strictly better than mˆ, it has to be true that the matching m˜∗ of the workers within the set
R1 is different from mˆ. Due to the claim that m˜
∗ is strictly better than mˆ, the following has to be true∑
i∈R1
F (i)emaxi g(m˜
∗[i])>
∑
i∈R1
F (i)emaxi g(mˆ[i]) =
N∑
j=jˆ
F (mj)e
max
mj
g(j) (EC.30)
From rearrangement inequality, we know that
N∑
j=jˆ
F (mj)e
max
mj
g(j)≥
∑
i∈R1
F (i)emaxi g(m˜
∗[i]) (EC.31)
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The condition above (EC.31) contradicts (EC.30).
From the above we get that the set of workers in R1 have to be matched to the same clients by both the
matchings m˜∗ and mˆ, which means m˜∗ cannot be strictly better than mˆ.
Observe that the output of our assessment-matching rule is the same as mˆ because all the workers rank
the clients in the order of their qualities and the all the clients rank the workers based on their maximum
outputs. This shows that the total long-run revenue achieved by the proposed mechanism is the same as in
(EC.25).
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Appendix G: Proof of Theorem 4.
Before we give the Proof for Theorem 4, we first need to simplify and arrive at the expressions for the
long-run utilities for the workers and clients as given in Section 2.2.3. We only consider the assessment-
matching rules for which the limit of the matching exists across all the histories. Suppose the joint strategy
being used is pi. Under this joint strategy the limit of the assessment-matching rule is given as m∗pi. The
history that is induced by the joint strategy pi is defined as ht,pi0 and the h
t,pi
i for worker i. Note that the
limt→∞m(h
t,pi
0 ) =m
∗
pi, where the limit is defined using the standard Euclidean norm in the space RN as
the distance metric. Next, we will show that the above limit is attained after a finite number of time slots
denoted as Tlim. Note that the minimum distance between any two distinct matchings is finite and is given
as dmin. From the definition of limit, it is clear that there exists a constant Tlim such that if t≥ Tlim, then
the distance betweenm(ht,pi0 ) andm
∗
pi is less than dmin. Therefore, for all t≥ Tlim
m(ht,pi0 ) =m
∗
pi (EC.32)
Based on the above simplification we can write the long-run utility of a worker i and client x=m∗pi[i] as
follows.
Ui({pik}Nk=1|m, p) = lim
T→∞
T∑
t=Tlim
1
T + 1
p(F (i, x)pii(h
t,pi
i ), x)−C(i, x)pii(ht,pii )2
= lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
1
T + 1
p(F (i, x)pii(h
t,pi
i ), x)−C(i, x)pii(ht,pii )2
(EC.33)
Similar justification applies for the clients’ long-run utilities as well.
We write the matching achieved in bang-bang equilibrium at the start of the operational phase asmBBE .
The long-run utility for worker i in bang-bang equilibrium Ui({piMTBBk }Nk=1|mF , pF )is simplified below.
[
αF (i,mBBE[i])2g(mBBE[i])−C(i,mBBE[i])] (emaximBBE [i])2I(αF (i,mBBE[i])2g(mBBE[i])−C(i,mBBE[i])≥ 0)
(EC.34)
Define J :N ×S →R and L :N ×S →R as follows.
J(k,x) =
[
αF (k,x)2g(x)−C(k,x)]
L(k,x) = I(αF (k,x)2g(x)−C(k,x)≥ 0)
(EC.35)
We can write (EC.34) using (EC.35) more succinctly as follows.
Ui({piMTBBk }Nk=1|mF , pF ) = J(i,mBBE[i])L(i,mBBE[i])(emaximBBE [i])2 (EC.36)
The long-run utility for clientmBBE[m], where m 6= i, in bang-bang equilibrium is given as follows.
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(1−αF (m,mBBE[m])emaxmmBBE [m])
I(αF (m,mBBE[m])2g(mBBE[m])−C(m,mBBE[m])≥ 0)F (m,mBBE[m])emaxmmBBE [m]
(EC.37)
We can simplify (EC.37) using (EC.35) as follows.
(1−αF (m,mBBE[m])emaxmmBBE [m])L(m,mBBE[m])F (m,mBBE[m])emaxmmBBE [m] (EC.38)
Suppose worker i is matched to client mBBE[m] instead in the operational phase. Our objective here is to
show that it is not possible for both worker i and client mBBE[m] to increase their long-run utilities by
being matched to one another and this holds true for every i 6=m.
If the utility for worker i strictly increases by being matched to mBBE[m], then it has to hold
true that
[
αF (i,mBBE[m])2g(mBBE[m])−C(i,mBBE[m])](emax
imBBE [m]
)2 has to be strictly higher than[
αF (i,mBBE[i])2g(mBBE[i])−C(i,mBBE[i])](emax
imBBE [i]
)2. This has to hold true because otherwise the
maximum utility that worker i can achieve by getting matched to mBBE[m] will always be lesser than
or equal to the long-run utility that the worker can achieve by getting matched to task mBBE[i] in the
operational phase of the bang-bang equilibrium.
We can write the utility for worker i when it is matched to mBBE[m] (denoted as Uˆm
BBE [m]
i (pi
′
i|pF ))
in the operational phase and when it follows strategy pi
′
i as follows. As explained in Section 2, that it is
sufficient to consider the strategies pi
′
i that only depend on time.
Uˆ
mBBE [m]
i (pi
′
i|pF ) = J(i,mBBE[m])L(i,mBBE[m]) lim
T→∞
T∑
t=N+1
pi
′
i(t)
2
T + 1
(EC.39)
We write limT→∞
∑T
t=N+1
pi
′
i(t)
2
T+1
= e¯2i , limT→∞
∑T
t=N+1
pi
′
i(t)
T+1
= e¯i and substitute in (EC.39) to obtain the
following..
Uˆ
mBBE [m]
i (pi
′
i|pF ) = J(i,mBBE[m])L(i,mBBE[m])e¯2i (EC.40)
Also, the utility for clientmBBE[m] in this case is derived as follows.
Vˆ imBBE [m](pi
′
i|pF ) = lim
T→∞
T∑
t=N+1
1
T + 1
[
1−αF (i,mBBE[m])pi′i(t)
]
L(i,mBBE[m])F (i,mBBE[m])pi
′
i(t)
=
[
F (i,mBBE[m])e¯i−αF (i,mBBE[m])2e¯2i
]
L(i,mBBE[m])
≤ [F (i,mBBE[m])e¯i−αF (i,mBBE[m])2(e¯i)2]L(i,mBBE[m])
(EC.41)
Based on the G-S algorithm and the fact that every worker uses MTBB strategy, we know that the rank
of worker m is higher than the rank of worker i for taskmBBE[m].
F (m,mBBE[m])emaxmmBBE [m] >F (i,m
BBE[m])emaximBBE [m] (EC.42)
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From the above (EC.42), either the productivity or the maximum effort has to be strictly higher. From
Assumption 1, we know that if one of them is true, then the other is also true. In addition, we can say the
following:
F (m,mBBE[m])≥ F (i,mBBE[m]) =⇒ C(i,mBBE[m])≥C(m,mBBE[m]) (EC.43)
Based on the above (EC.43), we can show the following.
J(m,mBBE[m])≥ J(i,mBBE[m]) (EC.44)
L(m,mBBE[m])≥L(i,mBBE[m]) (EC.45)
Observe that the function (1 − αx)x is increasing in [0, 1
2α
]. We assumed that α ≤ 1
2Wmax
. Therefore,
(1−αx)x is increasing is x∈ [0,Wmax]. Note that
Wmax ≥F (m,mBBE[m])emaxmmBBE [m] ≥F (i,mBBE[m])emaximBBE [m] ≥F (i,mBBE[m])pi
′
i(t) (EC.46)
We can use the above relations (EC.43), (EC.44), (EC.45), (EC.46) to derive the following condition on
the expression in (EC.41). [
F (i,mBBE[m])e¯i−αF (i,mBBE[m])2e¯i2
]
L(i,mBBE[m])≤[
F (i,mBBE[m])emaximBBE [m]−αF (i,mBBE[m])2(emaximBBE [m])2
]
L(i,mBBE[m])≤[
F (m,mBBE[m])emaxmmBBE [m]−αF (m,mBBE[m])2(emaxmmBBE [m])2
]
L(m,mBBE[m])
(EC.47)
Therefore, from the above (EC.47), we can see that the client mBBE[m] cannot have a strict gain at the
same time as worker i. Thus we can conclude that the proposed assessment-matching rule has to be long-run
stable w.r.t bang-bang equilibrium strategy (joint MTBB strategy).
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Appendix H: Example of a mechanism that only uses outputs and not the reports
In this section, we show through an example that in some mechanisms (similar to existing mechanisms) that
only operate on the performance of the workers, the workers may not be willing to exert maximum effort in
the assessment phase and may instead try to manipulate the beliefs of the planner.
The planner observes the workers performance in the assessment phase and then matches the workers to
the tasks as follows. We use the same notation W e as given in Section 2 for the outputs observed by the
planner, where W e(i, x) is the output generated by worker i when matched to task x. The planner expects
that the workers will continue to perform at the same level in the operational phase as well. Based on this
expectation, the planner solves the following optimization to compute the best possible matching from the
set of all the possible matchings.
max
m˜
N∑
k=1
W e(k,m˜[k])g(m˜[k]) (EC.48)
In the above, m˜ is a bijective mapping given as m˜ :N →S.
Suppose there are two workers and two tasks. The productivities and the costs of the workers are given
as F =
[
6 6
5 4
]
, C =
[
1 2
1 2
]
. The maximum effort for every worker on each task is the same and is equal to
1. Suppose that task 1 pays more for than task 2, i.e. p(w,1)> p(w,2) for the same amount of output w.
In the assessment phase, if worker 1 and worker 2 both exert maximum effort on both task 1 and 2, then
the mechanism will assign worker 1 to task 2 and worker 2 to task 1. Observe that both workers prefer task 1
to task 2. Therefore, worker 1 should instead exert no effort on task 2 and continue to exert maximum effort
on task 1. In this case, worker 1 is assigned task 1 and worker 2 is assigned to task 2. Also, it is important to
note that for worker 1 to know whether to reduce its effort on task 2 or not, it needs much more information
about the other worker and its costs. The above example shows that how a worker can manipulate the beliefs
through its performance in order to be assigned the task of its choice.
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Appendix I: Details of the simulation setup in Section 3.
In the numerical simulation setup, we will consider the settings where the Assumption 2 to holds. Half of
the workers’ productivities are independently drawn from a uniform distribution U ∼ [0,w1] and rest of
the workers are drawn independently from a uniform distribution U ∼ [0,w2]. If worker i’s productivity is
given as F (i), then the cost for exerting effort is defined as C(i) = C1 − C2F (i). The task qualities are
drawn independently from a distribution t1 + t2 × U [0,1]. The maximum effort for all the workers is the
same and given as emax. The linear payment rule is defined as: each client pays the worker a fraction of the
revenue generated β ∈ [0,1] to the worker. The quadratic payment rule is defined as: each client x pays the
worker αw2g(x) for generating w output, where α≤ 1
2 max{w1,w2}emax . The number of workers are allowed
to vary from 10 to 100. The other parameters are set as follows w1 = 20, w2 = 14, C1 = 2, C2 = 0.05,
t1 = 2, t2 = 10.
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Appendix J: Extensions
Repeated assessment-matching mechanism design in a stochastic setting. In this section, we will extend
the model to stochastic output/revenue. We will assume that the output of a worker will stochastically
depend on the worker’s productivity, the effort exerted and the task quality. We assume an additive noise
based model to quantify the output produced. Suppose worker i works on task j and exerts effort ei then
the revenue generated is given as
F (i, j)eig(j) +Z(i, j),
where Z(i, j) is a random variable representing noise when worker i works on task j. We assume that
Z(i, j) has zero mean and has a finite variance Σ(i, j)2, where Σ is the matrix of variances. The random
noises in the output of different workers are mutually independent random variables. We assume that the
mean and the variance of Z(i, j) is known to the planner and the clients. Also, the noise random variables
in different time slots are mutually independent (We do not need further assumptions on the distribution
of Z(i, j)). Before we proceed, note that in this section, we make a simplifying assumption that the task
qualities are known to the workers.
In the model for a non-stochastic setting, we defined the matching and the payment rule in a general
manner and they depended on the history of the observations made by the planner.
We assume that the mechanism has a total of T + 1 time slots.
Set of assessment-matching rules: The assessment-matching rule for this case is given asmT :HT+10 →
Π(S). mT (ht0)[i] denotes the task assigned to worker i following history ht0. The observation history con-
sists of the output history of the workers and the reports sent by the workers to the planner. We use super-
script T over the matching rule mT to make the distinction with the mechanism with infinite number of
time slots T =∞. The set of all the possible assessment-matching rulesmT is denoted asMT .
Set of payment rules: The payment rule for this case is given as pT : [0,∞)×S →R. pT (w, j) denotes
the amount paid by client j to a worker for producing output w. The set of all the possible payment rules
pT is denoted as PT .
The mechanism set by the planner is denoted as ΩT and is equal to (mT , pT ). Therefore, we can define
the set of all the possible mechanisms asMT ×PT .
Utility of the workers and the clients: Worker i’s strategy is defined as piTi :HT+1i →Ai is a mapping
from histories of length less than T + 1 to the set of actions, where the action of the worker include the
effort levels and the reports. For simplicity, in this extension we assume that the worker can also observe
the revenue generated. The observation history of the worker includes the revenues generated, the payments
received, the efforts exerted and the tasks assigned. The set of all the possible strategies for the workers is
denoted as ΠT (ΩT ).
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Worker i exerts effort eti in time slot t following a private history h
t
i and the planner’s observation history
ht0 and generates revenue
ri(h
t
0,h
t
i,pii|m) =
[
F (i,mT
(
ht0
)
[i])eti +Z
t
imT (ht0)[i]
]
g(mT
(
ht0
)
[i])
The total expected output when there are T + 1 time slots in the mechanism is given as.
R¯({piTi }Ni=1|mT ) =EZ [
1
T + 1
T∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
ri(h
t
0,h
t
i,pii|mT ))]
In the above expression, the expectation EZ in the above expression is taken with respect to the joint
distribution of the noise random variables defined over the T + 1 time slots. The utility derived by worker i
during time slot t following a private history hti and the planner’s history of h
t
0 when it exerts effort e
t
i is
ui(h
t
0,h
t
i,pi
T
i |mT , pT ) = pT (F (i,mT (ht0)[i])eti,mT (ht0)[i])−C(i,mT (ht0)[i])(eti)2
The expected long-run utility for worker i when there is a total of T + 1 time slots in the mechanism is
U¯i({piTk }Nk=1|mT , pT ) =EZ [
1
T + 1
T∑
t=0
ui(h
t
0,h
t
i,pi
T
i |mT , pT )]
In the above expression, the expectation EZ is taken with respect to the joint distribution of the noise
random variables defined over the T + 1 time slots. Similarly, we can define the utility for the clients as
well. The utility derived by client j who is matched to a worker i (with a private history hti) during time slot
t following planner’s observation history ht0 is
vj(h
t
0,h
t
i,pi
T
i |mT , pT ) = ri(ht0,hti,pii|m)− pT (F (i,mT (ht0)[i])eti,mT (ht0)[i])
The expected long-run utility for client j when there are a total of T + 1 time slots in the mechanism is
V¯j({piTk }Nk=1|mT , pT ) =EZ [
1
T + 1
T∑
t=0
vj(h
t+1
0 ,h
t
i,pi
T
i |mT , pT )]
Knowledge of the planner, the workers, and the clients: The knowledge structure is the same as dis-
cussed in Section 2, except we assume that the workers know the qualities of the tasks and can observe the
revenue generated by them.
Objective of the mechanism design problem: We define the planner’s problem in the same way as we
did in Section 2.
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max
mT∈MT ,pT∈PT
min
{piT
k
}N
k=1
∈ΠT (ΩT )
R¯({pik}Nk=1|mT , pT )
s.t. V¯j({piTk }Nk=1|mT , pT )≥ 0, ∀j ∈ S (IR-clients)
U¯i({piTk }Nk=1|mT , pT )≥ 0 ∀i∈N (IR-workers)
U¯i(pi
T
i ,{piTk }Nk=1,k 6=i|mT , pT )≥ U¯i(pi
′T
i ,{piTk }Nk=1,k 6=i|mT , pT ) ∀i∈N ∀pi
′T
i ∈ΠTi (IC-workers)
Next, we describe the proposed mechanism, which we refer to as the modified mechanism. It is a natural
extension of the mechanism proposed in Section 2.
Modified Mechanism.
The modified mechanism has two components.
A) Payment rule: We assume that the client follows a similar payment rule as in the first part. Suppose
that worker i when matched to task j generates revenue (stochastic)R(i, j). The client will pay the worker
αR(i, j)2/g(j)−αΣ(i,j)2
g(j)
per unit output.
If the planner uses the same matching rule as proposed in Section 2, then the outcomes can can be
poor because the noise in the output can mislead the planner to identify low productivity workers as high
productivity workers and vice-versa. We propose a natural extension of the matching rule proposed in
Section 2. The first phase, i.e. the assessment phase, will now consist of multiple time slots to evaluate each
worker on a particular task. In this phase, the planner will develop an estimate for the outputs of the workers
and then use it in the next phase to match them. In the next phase, the reporting phase the workers will
submit their preferences. In the final phase, i.e. the operational phase the workers and clients are matched
using the preferences from the reporting phase.
B) IILI assessment-matching rule: . We propose a nature extension to the proposed FILI assessment-
matching rule here, which we refer to as the IILI assessment-matching rule, where IILI stands for “Initial
Impression is the Last Impression”.
• Assessment phase (0≤ t≤N√T − 1). We will assume that T is sufficiently large (T ≥N 2) because
we will need a sufficient number of time slots for assessment. This phase comprises of the first N
√
T
time slots. We assume that
√
T is an integer for convenience. This phase is divided into N sub-phases,
each of length
√
T . In sub-phase-k worker i is matched to each task [(k+ i) mod N ] for
√
T time
slots. The planner computes the sample mean estimate of the output produced by the worker i on task
j in phase-i over the
√
T time slots. We write the matrix of the estimates of the outputs as Wˆ
e
, where
Wˆ
e
(i, j) is the estimate of output of worker i on task j.
• Reporting phase (t=N√T ): In this phase, at the start of time slot t=N√T , the planner requests
the workers to submit their preferences in the form of ranks for tasks. The planner also computes the
ranking of workers based on the estimates of normalized outputs Wˆ e as follows. For every task j, the
e-companion to Ahuja and van der Schaar: Dynamic Assessments, Matching and Allocation of Tasks ec25
planner ranks the workers based on the estimates of normalized outputs for each task j {Wˆ e(i, j)}Ni=1.
In this time slot t, the worker i is matched to task (t+ i) mod N .
• Operational phase (N√T +1≤ t≤ T ): The aim of this phase is to compute the matching for workers
based on the observations made in the assessment phase. The planner computes the matching based on
the G-S algorithm as follows. The workers are the proposers and the tasks are the acceptors. In every
step, each worker proposes to its favorite task that has already not rejected it. Each task, based on the
proposals it gets keeps its favorite worker on hold and rejects the rest. At the end of N 2 − 2N + 2
steps, the matching that is achieved is final for all the remaining time slots in the mechanism. Each
worker then decides the amount of effort to exert on the task assigned in every time slot. The task that
a worker is matched to remains the same for the time slots to follow.
PROPOSITION EC.1. If α ≤ 1
2Wmax
, then all the clients and the workers are willing to participate in the
mechanism.
The proof of the above proposition works on similar lines as Proposition 1.
The above mechanism induces a stochastic repeated endogenous matching game. In the next section, we
propose a strategy, which we prove is an equilibrium strategy for the workers.
Stochastic MTBB strategy In this section, we propose a natural extension of the MTBB strategy, which
we refer to as the stochastic MTBB, as follows. We denote the strategy for worker i as piT,bangi .
• Assessment phase (0 ≤ t ≤ N√T − 1) : In each time slot, worker i should exert the maximum
effort emaxi . The worker observes the payments received, the costs for exerting effort, and the revenue
generated. Hence, the ratio of the revenue generated and the task quality times the effort exerted gives
an estimate for the productivity in one time period. For (k− 1)√T ≤ t≤ k√T the match for worker i
is j = (k+ i) mod N .
F˜ (i, j)t =
ri(h
t
i,h
t
0,pi
T,bang
i |mT )
g(j)emaxi
At the end of assessment phase (after N
√
T time slots), the worker computes the following estimate
for its productivity on every task j
Fˆ (i, j) =
1√
T
N
√
T−1∑
t=0
F˜ (i,m(ht0)[i])
tI(m(ht0)[i] = j) (EC.49)
• Reporting phase (t = N√T ) In this phase, worker i uses the estimates computed in the previous
phase to compute the estimate of the long-run utilities from different tasks as follows. For each task
j, the worker i computes the estimate of the utility α(Fˆ (i, j))2g(j) − C(i, j) and ranks the tasks
based on this computed value. The worker then submits these rankings to the planner. Also, the worker
continues to exert maximum effort on the task assigned in this phase.
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• Operational phase: Suppose worker i is allocated a task with index r (based on the G-S algorithm).
If α(Fˆ (i, r))2g(r)−C(i, r)> 0, then the worker exerts maximum effort in every time slot to follow,
otherwise the worker exerts zero effort in every time slot.
Next, we will show that the long-run utility achieved by the above strategy is  close to the optimal. Before
we state the theorem, we will state an additional assumption. We assume that the values corresponding to
the expected utilities of worker i defined by {αF (i, j)2g(j)−C(i, j)}Nj=1 are all distinct.
THEOREM EC.1. Stochastic Bang-Bang Equilibrium (S-BBE)
If T ≥ N2Γ

, then
1. The stochastic MTBB for a worker is the  best response to other workers’ strategies.
2. If all the workers follow the stochastic MTBB strategy, then it comprises an  equilibrium referred to
as stochastic bang-bang equilibrium S-BBE.
Γ is defined later in the proof of Theorem EC.1.
Remark 1. The structure of the above mechanism and the corresponding equilibrium strategy discussed
above suffer from the limitation that the mechanism may require a long assessment phase, which may not be
desirable. It is not conceptually very different to construct mechanisms that only allow for periodic assess-
ments instead of an entire assessment phase and show that the results can be extended to such environments
as well. Such mechanisms are reminiscent of ongoing evaluations in any firm.
Proof of Theorem EC.1. We start by proving the first part. We define the probability space over which
we will define the noise random variables. {Σ1,F , P} defines the probability space, where Γ is the sample
space, F is the sigma field of the events and P is the probability measure.
Define Z(i, j)t : Σ1→ R as the noise random variable representing the noise in the revenue generated
by worker i working on task j in time slot t. Z(i, j)t has zero mean and a finite variance denoted as
σ2ij . The random variables Z(i, j)
t, i ∈ {1, ..,N}, j ∈ 1, ..,N and t ∈ {0, ..∞}} are mutually independent.
The random variables across time Z(i, j)t and Z(i, j)t
′
have identical distribution as well. In this case,
the history of the workers and the planner are random variables as well because the revenue generated is
stochastic. We will write the history for worker i as a random variable Hti and for the planner as H
t
0. We
define the histories for the worker and the planner as follows. For worker i at time t Hti is the random
variable that contains the set of observations up to time t. For the planner at time t Ht0 is the random variable
that contains the set of observations up to time t. We initialize H0i = φ and H
0
0 = φ. The worker observes
the stochastic output given as
W˜i(H
t
i ,H
t
0,pi
T
i |mT ) =F (i,mT (Ht0)[i])piTi (Hti ) +
Z(i,mT (H0)
t[i])
g(mT (Ht0)[i])
(EC.50)
The corresponding revenue for the worker is given as
R˜i(H
t
i ,H
t
0,pi
T
i |mT ) = W˜i(Hti ,Ht0,piTi |mT )g(mT (Ht0)[i]) (EC.51)
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If ω is a realization in the sample space, then the corresponding output is written as follows.
W˜i(H
t
i (ω),H
t
0(ω),pi
T
i |mT ) =F (i,mT (Ht0(ω))[i]))piTi (Hti (ω)) +
Z(i,mT (Ht0(ω))i])
g(mT (Ht0(ω))[i])
(EC.52)
The utility of the worker for the particular time slot t is given as ui(Hti ,H
t
0,pi
T
i |mT , pT ). Hence, the
history for worker i in time slot t+ 1 is given as
Ht+1i =H
t
i ∪{R˜i(Hti ,Ht0,piTi |mT ), g(mT (Ht0)[i]), ui(Hti ,Ht0, piTi |mT , pT ),piTi (Hti )} (EC.53)
The planner observes the revenue generated by all the workers and the task assigned to the workers and
its history is given as
Ht+10 =H
t
0 ∪{{R˜i(Hti ,Ht0,piTi |mT ), g(mT (Ht0)[i])}Ni=1} (EC.54)
We claim that the highest expected utility a worker i can get in any time slot t is given as
max
j
(αF (i, j)2g(j)−C(i, j))I(αF (i, j)2g(j)−C(i, j)≥ 0)(emaxi )2 (EC.55)
The expected utility derived by worker i in a particular time slot t is
αE[
R˜i(H
t
i ,H
t
0, pi
T
i |mT )2
g(mT (Ht0)[i])
−α
σ2
imT (Ht0)[i]
g(mT (Ht0)[i])
−C(i,mT (Ht0)[i])pii(Hti )2] (EC.56)
The first term E[ R˜i(H
t
i ,H
t
0,pi
T
i |mT )2
g(mT (Ht0)[i])
] in the above expression (EC.56) is expanded as follows.
E
[
F (i,mT (Ht0)[i]))
2piTi (H
t
i )
2g(mT (Ht0)[i])+2Z(i,m
T (Ht0)[i])
tF (i,mT (Ht0)[i])pi
T
i (H
t
i )+
[Z(i,mT (Ht0)[i])
t]2
g(mT (Ht0)[i])
]
(EC.57)
In the above expression (EC.57), there are three random variables. It is easy to show that the expectation
of all the three of them will exist. In the first term, the random variable only takes finitely many values thus
the expectation has to exist. For the second random variable, we know that the expectation of E[Z(i, j)t]
exists for all j and for all t and is equal to zero. We use the iterated expectation property to show that
expected value of the second term is zero.
E[Z(i,mT (Ht0)[i])
tF (i,mT (Ht0)[i])pi
T
i (H
t
i )] =E[E[Z(i,m
T (Ht0)[i])
t|Ht0,Hti ]piTi (Hti )F (i,mT (Ht0)[i])]
(EC.58)
The term E[Z(i,mT (Ht0)[i])
t|Ht0,Hti ] has to equals zero because E[Z(i, j)t] = 0 for all j and for all t.
Similarly, we can simplify the following
E[
Z2
imT (Ht0)[i]
g(mT (Ht0)[i])
] =E[E[Z2imT (Ht0)[i]
|Ht0]
1
g(mT (Ht0))[i])
] (EC.59)
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E[(Z(i,mT (Ht0)[i])
t)
2 |Ht0] = σ2imT (Ht0)[i]
Hence, we get the following simplified expression for (EC.57).
E[F (i,mT (Ht0)[i]))
2piTi (H
t
i )
2g(mT (Ht0)[i])] +E[
σ2
imT (Ht0)[i]
g(mT (Ht0)[i])
] (EC.60)
We substitute the above (EC.60) in (EC.56) to obtain
E[(αF (i,mT (Ht0)[i])
2g(mT (Ht0)[i])−C(i,mT (Ht0)[i])pii(Hti )2] (EC.61)
Next, we compute an upper bound for the above expression (EC.61).We do so by computing the
maximum value that the random variable (αF (i,mT (Ht0)[i])
2g(mT (Ht0)[i])−C(i,mT (Ht0)[i])pii(Hti )2
can take following the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 1. Therefore, the random vari-
able (αF (i,mT (Ht0)[i])
2g(mT (Ht0)[i]) − C(i,mT (Ht0)[i]))I(αF (i,mT (Ht0)[i])2g(mT (Ht0)[i]) −
C(i,mT (Ht0)[i]) ≥ 0)(emaxi )2 point-wise dominates αF (i,mT (Ht0)[i])2g(mT (Ht0)[i]) −
C(i,mT (Ht0)[i])pii(H
t
i )
2.
Further (αF (i,mT (Ht0)[i])
2g(mT (Ht0)[i])−C(i,mT (Ht0)[i]))I(αF (i,mT (Ht0)[i])2g(mT (Ht0)[i])−
C(i,mT (Ht0)[i])≥ 0) is bounded above by maxj(αF (i, j)2g(j)−C(i, j))I(αF (i, j)2g(j)−C(i, j)≥ 0).
This justifies the upper bound stated in (EC.55).
Next, we write the expected utility for worker i when there is a total of T + 1 slots in the mechanism.
We decompose the utility in three parts: first part is the contribution from the assessment phase, the second
part is the contribution from the reporting phase, and the third part is the contribution from the operational
phase.
UTi ({piTj }Nj=1|mT , pT ) =Uassmt,Ti ({piTj }Nj=1|mT , pT )+U rept,Ti ({piTj }Nj=1|mT , pT )+U opnl,Ti ({piTj }Nj=1|mT , pT )
(EC.62)
The first two terms in the above expression decays to zero as T increases (because the expected utility
for a single time slot is finite).
Uassmt,Ti ({piTj }Nj=1|MT , P T ) +U rept,Ti ({piTj }Nj=1|mT , pT )≤
max
j
(αF (i, j)2g(j)−C(i, j))I(αF (i, j)2g(j)−C(i, j)≥ 0)(emaxi )2
N 2
√
T
T + 1
(EC.63)
We now turn to computing the third term in (EC.62). In the operational phase, the planner will compare
the estimate of outputs.
Wˆ
e
(i, j) =
1√
T + 1
N
√
T−1∑
t=0
W˜i(H
t
i ,H
t
0,pi
T
i |mT )I(mT (Ht0)[i] = j) (EC.64)
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The matching computed at the beginning of the operational phase uses the above estimates and the pref-
erence lists submitted by the workers as inputs. For the worker, the preference list that is submitted is
also a random vector as well because the strategy of the worker depends on the private history, which is
stochastic. We write Bˆi as the random vector for represent the preference list submitted by worker i. We
denote the matching computed based on the G-S algorithm applied to the set of preferences of the work-
ers and tasks as follows. mGS(Wˆ
e
,{Bˆk}Nk=1). For the consistency of notation, we state that mT (Ht0)[i] =
mGS(Wˆ
e
,{Bˆk}Nk=1)[i] for all i and t≥N
√
T + 1. We can compute the expected utility for a single time
slot of the operational phase in a manner exactly similar to that of the assessment phase and thus get the
following expression. Hence, the third term in (EC.62) is given as follows.
E[(αF (i,mGS(Wˆ
e
,{Bˆk}Nk=1)[i])2g(mGS(Wˆ
e
,{Bˆk}Nk=1)[i])−C(i,mGS(Wˆ
e
,{Bˆk}Nk=1)[i]))
T∑
t=N
√
T+1
1
T
pii(H
t
i )
2]
(EC.65)
We aim to derive the upper bound for the above expression by maximizing the RHS over the space of
strategies for worker i. The random variable inside the expectation can be written in terms of the expression
defined in (EC.7) as follows.
H i(Wˆ
e
,{Bˆk}Nk=1)
T∑
t=N
√
T+1
1
T
pii(H
t
i )
2 (EC.66)
Next, we show that any realization of the above random variable (EC.66) is dominated by another random
variable defined as follows (using the ideas exactly as in the Proof of Theorem 1).
H i(Wˆ
e
,{Bˆk}Nk=1)I(H i(Wˆ
e
,{Bˆk}Nk=1))(emaxi )2
T −N√T
T + 1
(EC.67)
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we claim that the optimal preference list of the worker rank the tasks in
the order of αF (i, j)2g(j)−C(i, j). We write the preference list based on ranking αF (i, j)2g(j)−C(i, j)
as B
′
i . We define another random variable below, which dominates the random variable in (EC.67)
H i(Wˆ
e
,B
′
i ,{Bˆk}Nk=1,k 6=i)I(H i(Wˆ
e
,B
′
i ,{Bˆk}Nk=1,k 6=i))(emaxi )2
T −N√T
T + 1
(EC.68)
The ith row of the matrix Wˆ
e
consists of the random variables that depend on the effort exerted by worker
i in the assessment phase on the tasks. Based on the same arguments as in the Proof of Theorem 1, we can
argue that it is always better to exert maximum effort on every task in the assessment phase. If worker i
exerts maximum effort in all the time slots in the assessment phase and submits the list B
′
i , then we write
the matching for worker i asm∗[i], which is a random variable in this case unlike the non-stochastic setting
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in the Theorem 1. Based on the above, we can compute an upper bound for the expression in (EC.68) as
follows.
U opnl,Ti ≤ (emaxi )2
T −N√T
T + 1
E[Y ] (EC.69)
In the above
Y = (αF (i,m∗[i])2g(m∗[i])−C(i,m∗[i]))I((αF (i,m∗[i])2g(m∗[i])−C(i,m∗[i])≥ 0)
In (EC.69), we derived the upper bound for the long-run average utility in the operational phase. In addition,
we have also seen that the long-run average utility in the assessment phase will decay to a small value as
T becomes sufficiently large. Next, our goal is to compute the long-run average utility of the proposed
stochastic MTBB strategy in the operational phase. We write Bˆi to denote the preference list submitted by
the worker under the proposed stochastic MTBB strategy. Recall that worker i exerts the maximum effort
in each time slot in the assessment phase. We write the matching achieved by worker i following stochastic
MTBB strategy in the operational phase is mprop[i]. Worker i develops an estimate for its productivity on
each task in the assessment phase, which we write as Fˆ (i, j).
U opnl,Ti = (e
max
i )
2T −N
√
T
T + 1
E[X] (EC.70)
In the above
X = αF (i,mprop[i])2g(mprop[i])−C(i,mprop[i])]I(αFˆ (i,mprop[i])2g(mprop[i])−C(i,mprop[i])≥ 0)
mprop[i] andm∗[i] are equal as long as the preference list submitted by worker i in the stochastic MTBB
strategy Bˆi =B
′
i . Let us assume that the set {αF (i, j)2g(j)−C(i, j)}Nj=1 consists of only distinct values.
Suppose the minimum separation between any two elements in the set is ∆ > 0. Therefore, if Fˆ (i, j) is
sufficiently close to F (i, j), i.e. within ∆1 distance, then the ranking submitted by worker under stochastic
MTBB Bˆi will be the same as B
′
i . We compute the condition on ∆1 that ensures the above holds.
α(F (i, j) + ∆1)
2g(j)−αF (i, j)2g(j)≤∆/2 =⇒ α∆21g(j) + 2α∆1F (i, j)g(j)≤∆/2 (EC.71)
If ∆1 < 1, then we derive a sufficient condition on ∆1 to satisfy the above constraint as follows
α∆21g(j) + 2α∆1F (i, j)g(j)≤ α∆1g(j) + 2α∆1F (i, j)g(j)≤∆/2 (EC.72)
We simplify the above to get ∆1 <min{1, ∆2αg(j)+2αF (i,j)g(j)}
There are three possibilities
αF (i,m∗[i])2g(m∗[i])−C(i,m∗[i])> 0 or
αF (i,m∗[i])2g(m∗[i])−C(i,m∗[i])< 0 or
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αF (i,m∗[i])2g(m∗[i])−C(i,m∗[i]) = 0
If αF (i,m∗[i])2g(m∗[i])−C(i,m∗[i]) = 0, then as long asm∗[i] =mprop[i] there will be no difference
in the utility of our proposed strategy and the upper bound.
If
αF (i,m∗[i])2g(m∗[i])−C(i,m∗[i])> 0
or
αF (i,m∗[i])2g(m∗[i])−C(i,m∗[i])< 0
is true, then we define another constant ∆2 as follows.
∆2 = min
k∈N
|αF (k,m∗[k])2g(m∗[k])−C(k,m∗[k])
s.t.|αF (k,m∗[k])2g(m∗[k])−C(k,m∗[k])|> 0
(EC.73)
Ifmprop[i] =m∗[i], then we still need an extra condition on ∆1 to ensure that
I(αFˆ (i,mprop[i])2g(mprop[i])−C(i,mprop[i])≥ 0) = I(αF (i,m∗[i])2g(m∗[i])−C(i,m∗[i])≥ 0)
(EC.74)
The extra condition on ∆1 can be derived on the same lines as the derivation in (EC.72). Therefore, the
final condition is given as
∆1 <min{1, ∆
2αg(j) + 2αF (i, j)g(j)
,
∆2
2αg(j) + 2αF (i, j)g(j)
} (EC.75)
Using the expression in (EC.49), we can derive V ar[Fˆ (i, j)]≤ σ
2
ij
g(N)2(emaxi )
2
√
T+1
.
We use Chebyshev’s inequality to compute
P (|Fˆ (i, j)−F (i, j)| ≤∆1)≥ 1−
σ2ij
∆1(g(N)emaxi )
2(
√
T + 1)
(EC.76)
In the above (EC.76), note that instead of Chebyshev’s inequality we can use the Chernoff-Hoeffeding’s
inequality to arrive at a tighter bound. The lower bound on the probability that there is no difference between
X in (EC.70) and Y in (EC.55) is (1− σ
2
ij
∆1g(N)2(e
max
i )
2(
√
T+1)
)N . Thus there is a difference with a probability
at most 1− (1− σ
2
ij
∆1g(N)2(e
max
i )
2(
√
T+1)
)N . If
σ2ij
∆1G(N)2(e
max
i )
2(
√
T+1)
< 1, then using Bernoulli’s inequality we
get
1− (1− σ
2
ij
∆1g(N)2(emaxi )
2(
√
T + 1)
)N ≤ σ
2
ijN
∆1g(N)2(emaxi )
2(
√
T + 1)
(EC.77)
If T ≥ σ
4
ij
∆21g(N)
4(emaxi )
4 =⇒ σ
2
ij
∆1g(N)2(e
max
i )
2(
√
T+1)
< 1
From the above, we know that the random variable X is equal to Y with a probability greater than
1 − σ
2
ijN
∆1g(N)2(e
max
i )
2
√
T+1
. Also, note that X > xmin = min{minj∈S (αF (i, j)2g(j)−C(i, j))(emaxi )2,0}.
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We require that the gap between the proposed utility and the upper bound is small. The difference between
the long-run utility of the proposed stochastic MTBB strategy in (EC.70) and the upper bound (EC.69) is
(emaxi )
2T −N
√
T
T + 1
×E[Y −X] (EC.78)
Define a random variable D as follows, if Y = X , then D = 0, else D = ymax − xmin. ymax is the
maximum value Y can take and xmin is the smallest value X can take and ymax > xmin. It is clear that
Y −X ≤D. Next, we derive an upper bound on E[D]. D can take the value ymax−xmin with probability
at most
σ2ijN
g(N)2(emaxi )
2(
√
T+1)
and zero otherwise. Therefore,
E[D]≤ σ
2
ijN
∆1g(N)2(emaxi )
2(
√
T + 1)
(ymax−xmin) = Γ√
T + 1
≤ Γ√
T
(EC.79)
Hence, we can see that if T is sufficiently large, i.e. T ≥ 4Γ2/2 = 4[ σ2ijN
∆1g(N)2(e
max
i )
2 (y
max − xmin)]2/2,
then the above the difference between the proposed strategy’s expected utility and the upper bound is less
than /2. For the assessment phase and the reporting phase combined, the upper bound on the long- utility
over all the possible strategies for worker i is
max
j
(αF (i, j)2g(j)−C(i, j))I(αF (i, j)2g(j)−C(i, j)≥ 0)N
√
T
T + 1
≤ ymaxN
√
T
T + 1
(EC.80)
For the assessment and the reporting phase combined, the lower bound on the utility of the proposed
strategy as
xmin
N
√
T
T + 1
(EC.81)
Hence, the difference in the long-run utility of the proposed stochastic MTBB and the upper bound for
the assessment and reporting phase combined is given as
(ymax−xmin)N
√
T
T + 1
≤ (y
max−xmin)N√
T
(EC.82)
Define T1() = max{4(N 2(ymax − xmin)/2,4
[ σ2ijN
∆1g(N)2(e
max
i )
2 (y
max − xmin)]2/2}. If T ≥ T1(), then
the difference between the long-run utility of the proposed stochastic MTBB strategy and the upper bound
on the long-run utility for every strategy of worker i is less than . This proves the first part.
If all the workers follow the stochastic MTBB strategy, then the second part of the Theorem follows
immediately from the definition of  equilibrium.
COROLLARY EC.1. The regret for every worker i decreases as ( ζi√
T
).
Proof of Corollary EC.1. In the previous proof, we derived the upper bounds for the maximum loss for the
worker in (EC.79), (EC.82). Using the maximum loss incurred by the workers, we can define the regret as
the sum of the losses in (EC.79) (EC.82). ζi√
T
, where ζi = Γ + (ymax−xmin)
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THEOREM EC.2. If Assumptions 1-3 hold, then the ratio of the total long-run revenue of the modified
mechanism and the upper bound on the total long-run revenue that can be achieved by the proposed mech-
anism in Section 2 is at least (1− N2η√
T
).
Proof of Theorem EC.2. We first write the total long-run revenue as follows.
R({piTi }Ni=1|mT ) =E[
1
T + 1
T∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
ri(H
t
i ,H
t
0,pi
T
i |mT )] (EC.83)
First, we compute the long-run revenue generated by worker i when all the workers follow the proposed
stochastic MTBB strategy, which comprises the stochastic bang-bang equilibrium. If all the workers follow
the proposed stochastic MTBB strategy, then the matching achieved in the operational phase is mS−BBE .
In this case, the worker’s productivity and cost for exerting effort on the task does not vary across tasks.
Therefore, the best preference list for all the workers is to rank the tasks in the order of their quality. Recall
that the ranking of the workers is based on their maximum outputs. Since the maximum outputs of a worker
does not vary across the tasks, the rankings of the workers do not vary across the tasks and correspond to
the ranking of the workers based on their maximum outputs. Hence, all the workers have the same ranking
for the tasks and vice-versa.
We now describe the optimal matching that maximizes the total long-run revenue. Since the workers’
maximum outputs are homogeneous across the tasks, the optimal matching is the assortative matching
denoted as mAST : it matches the worker with kth highest maximum output to the task with kth highest
quality.
In our setting, if the estimates of the outputs of the workers based on their performance in assessment
phase, are ranked in the same order as their means (set of values of F (i)emaxi ), then the matching will
be optimal, i.e. mS−BBE =mAST . We write Fˆ (i) to denote the estimate that the worker has for its own
productivity.
The revenue generated by worker i following stochastic MTBB strategy is given as.
ri({piTk }Nk=1|mS−BBE) =E[
1
T + 1
T∑
t=N
√
T+1
ri(H
t
0,H
t
i , pi
T
i |mS−BBE)]
=E[
1
T + 1
T∑
t=N
√
T+1
(
F (i)emaxi g(m
S−BBE[i])I(Fˆ (i)2g(mS−BBE[i])−C(i)≥ 0) +Z(i,mS−BBE[i])t
)
]
(EC.84)
In the above expression, the second term in the above summation equals zero and the first term of the
summation does not depend on time t. Hence, we can simplify to obtain the following.
T −N√T
T + 1
E
[
F (i)emaxi g(m
S−BBE[i])I(αFˆ (i)2g(mS−BBE)[i]−C(i)≥ 0)
]
(EC.85)
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Next, we derive a lower bound for the above (EC.85). Observe that if the estimates Fˆ (i) and the actual
value of the productivity F (i) are sufficiently close, thenmS−BBE =mAST .
We use Chebyshev’s inequality in the same manner as we did in the proof of Theorem EC.1.
P (|Fˆ (i)−F (i)| ≤∆1)≥ 1−
σ2ij
∆1(g(N)emaxi )
2(
√
T + 1)
(EC.86)
Hence, if F (i)emaxi are all distinct and have a certain minimum separation between any two distinct values.
We use this to set ∆1 sufficiently small in such a way that |Fˆ (i)−F (i)| ≤∆1, ∀i ensures thatmS−BBE =
mAST . We also need to ensure that I(αFˆ (i)2g(mS−BBE[i])−C(i)≥ 0) = I(αF (i)2g(mAST )−C(i)≥ 0)
holds. Suppose αF (i)2g(mAST [i]) − C(i) > 0 or αF (i)2g(mAST [i]) − C(i) < 0, then there exists ∆4
for which |αF (i)2g(mAST )−C(i)| ≥∆4 > 0. Therefore, ∆1 also needs to satisfy the constraint that the
difference between αFˆ (i)2g(mS−BBE[i])−C(i) and αF (i)2g(mAST [i])−C(i) is sufficiently small. The
exact threshold for ∆1 can be derived by following a procedure similar to the one described in the Proof of
Theorem EC.1. Using the ∆1 that satisfies the above constraints and also using the expression in (EC.86)
we can derive the expression below.
T −N√T
T + 1
E
[
F (i)emaxi g(m
S−BBE[i])I(αFˆ (i)2g(mS−BBE[i])−C(i)≥ 0)
]
≥
T −N√T
T + 1
F (i)emaxi g(m
AST [i])I(αFˆ (i)2g(mAST [i])−C(i)≥ 0)(1− κ√
T + 1
)
≈ (1− N√
T
)F (i)emaxi g(m
AST [i])I(αFˆ (i)2g(mAST [i])−C(i)≥ 0)
(EC.87)
The detailed calculations of the above expression follow similar steps as given in the Proof of Theorem
EC.1. Therefore, by summing the revenue generated for all the workers, we get the result in Theorem we
set out to prove.
Other theorems. In the above extension with stochastic revenues, we derived the equilibrium and also
showed its efficiency. We have not explicitly shown the proof of uniqueness and the long-run stability unlike
the deterministic setting in Section 2. Next, we give insights into how the above results can be extended.
The main ideas in the Proof of Theorem 2 (uniqueness) can be extended to this setting in a straightforward
manner. For the proof of stability, we will first need to relax the stability guarantee to probabilistic one.
The theorem of long-run stability can be re-stated to show that if the proposed mechanism has sufficient
number of time slots, then it leads to long-run stable outcomes w.r.t stochastic MTBB strategy with a high
probability. The higher the minimum threshold on the probability needed the more is the minimum number
of time slots needed in the mechanism.
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J.1. Other extensions
Extension to discounted utilities. In the model in Section 2, we defined the long-run utilities as the undis-
counted average of the phase game utilities. In some situations it is more plausible to think that the number
of time slots in the mechanism cannot be fixed apriori and thus it is more useful to consider discounted util-
ities. The entire analysis can be extended to discounted utilities. We assume the same knowledge structure
as described in Section 2. Firstly, in this case, we need to relax the definition of equilibrium and instead use
 approximate definitions of the equilibrium. Observe that (from the proof of Theorem 1) for the proposed
stochastic MTBB strategies the source of loss is the assessment phase. If the discount factors are sufficiently
high, then the losses in the assessment phase can be sufficiently low and bounded above by .
In the operational phase, the utility achieved in each phase is at the maximum thus it can be shown that
the proposed stochastic MTBB strategy is the  best response (best response with at most  loss). The other
results, i.e. Theorem 2-4 can be extended in a similar manner.
Extension to client selected payment rules. In the model discussed in Section 2, we assumed that the
planner prescribes the payment rules to the clients. If the clients choose to participate in the mechanism,
then they need to follow the prescribed payment rules. In this extension, we will consider the setting where
the payment rules are not prescribed and are instead set/given by the clients. We consider a natural setting
where the payments are linear in the revenue generated by the worker, i.e. each client pays a certain fraction
of the revenue generated back to the worker. We assume the same knowledge structure as described in
Section 2. In addition, we will assume that every one knows that the payment rules are linear. Suppose that
client x pays a fraction ηx of the revenue generated (We assume that this value ηx is not a decision variable
and is given.). We assume that the planner continues to use the same proposed FILI matching rule (defined
in Section 2).
The above type of payment rules and the FILI matching rule induces a repeated endogenous matching
game between the set of workers and clients. Next, we briefly describe the equilibrium strategy for the
workers. In the assessment phase, each worker should always exert maximum effort. In the reporting phase,
each worker needs to submit a preference list computed as follows. For every task, each worker computes
the maximum long-run utility that it expects to derive by being assigned to it. It then ranks the tasks based on
these utilities and submits this ranking to the planner. In the operational phase, the worker is allocated a task
based on the rankings submitted by the workers and the rankings of the workers computed by the planner
(based on the outputs as described in Section 2 in the FILI matching rule). Based on the task allocated, the
worker decides the optimal amount of effort to exert in every time slot in the operational phase (this effort
can take a value strictly between zero and the maximum effort). Observe that the structure of the equilibrium
strategy, in this case, is very similar to the MTBB strategy in Section 2. The only difference here is that in
the operational phase, the workers may exert effort between zero and maximum effort level and thus the
structure of the strategy in that part is not necessarily bang-bang type.
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The result in Theorem 2 extends directly under the same assumptions. In Theorem 3, we proved that
in a wide-range of settings moral hazard and adverse selection are mitigated in BBE. For this extension,
we can find appropriate conditions under which a high fraction of the workers will exert maximum or
close to maximum effort possible thereby guaranteeing an effective mitigation of both moral hazard and
adverse selection. In Theorem 4, we showed that the proposed matching is long-run stable w.r.t BBE. In this
extension, we can show a similar result, which states that the proposed matching is long-run stable w.r.t to
the modified equilibrium strategy described above. The proof of this follows on the same lines as the proof
of Theorem 4.
Extension to worker and client arrivals and exits. The entire analysis assumes that the workers and
clients stay in the system forever. In this section, we discuss some possible ways to extend the mechanism
to incorporate such arrivals/exits in future works. A simple but suboptimal way of adapting the mechanism
to incorporate worker and client arrivals/exits will involve periodically repeating the proposed mechanism.
In this approach, if a client or a worker arrives post the beginning of the assessment phase, then it will need
to wait for the beginning of the next assessment phase. We describe an approach that adapts the proposed
mechanism online. For simplicity, we assume that in each time slot either a worker/client arrives or leaves.
Suppose that a new worker arrives (in the operational phase), then this worker can be separately evaluated.
Based on the assessments and the preferences of this worker, the planner checks if there exists a client who
prefers this worker more than the existing worker, then the client can hire the incoming worker starting next
time slot. In this case, the existing worker (current match) is replaced by the incoming worker. The planner
then tries to find a possible match for this worker who was replaced. A possible match in this case is a
client who prefers this worker to its current match. Suppose a worker exits or leaves a client, then the client
chooses the best possible worker from the set of workers, which can include the workers who are already
matched to some client and also the workers who are not matched to any client. If the worker prefer this
client more, then the worker leaves the current match to join this client. There can be similar extensions for
the client arrivals/exits.
References
Arnosti, N and Johari, R and Kanoria, Y (2014) Managing Congestion in Decentralized Matching Markets. Available
at SSRN 2427960.
Ashlagi I, Kanoria Y, Leshno JD (2014) Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition.
Unpublished mimeo.
Becker, GS (1974) A theory of marriage. Economics of the family: Marriage, children and human capital. 299-351
(University of Chicago, Press).
e-companion to Ahuja and van der Schaar: Dynamic Assessments, Matching and Allocation of Tasks ec37
Bikchchandani, S (2014) Two-sided matching with incomplete information. Technical report, working paper.
Dayama P, Narayanswamy B, Garg D, Narahari Y (2015) Truthful interval cover mechanisms for crowdsourcing
applications. Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
1091-1099 (International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent systems).
Fisher JC (2015) Matching with continuous bidirectional investment. University of Technology, Sydney, working paper.
Gale D, Shapley LS (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. American mathematical monthly 9-15.
Grossman GM, Helpman E, Kircher P (2013) Matching and sorting in a global economy. Technical report, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Ho CJ, Zhang Y, Vaughan J, Van der Schaar M (2012) Towards social norm design for crowdsourcing markets. AAAI
Workshops.
Hopkins E (2012) Job market signaling of relative position, or becker married to spence. Journal of the European
Economic Association 10(2):290322.
Karger DR, Oh S, Shah D (2014) Budget-optimal task allocation for reliable crowdsourcing systems. Operations
Research 62(1):1-24.
Kocer Y (2014) Dynamic Matching and Learning. Working Slides.
Luzarova E, Dimitrov D (2013) Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty. International Journal of
Game Theory 1-21.
Lee RS, Schwarz M (2009) Interviewing in two-sided matching markets. Technical report, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
Liu Q, Mailath GJ, Postlewaite A, Samuelson L (2014) Stable matching with incomplete information. Econometrica
82(2):541-587.
Rastegari B, Condon A, Immorlica N, Leyton-Brown K (2013) Two-sided matching with partial information. Pro-
ceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, 733-750 (ACM).
Roth AE (1982) The economics of matching: Stability and incentives. Mathematics of operations research, 7(4):617-
628.
ec38 e-companion to Ahuja and van der Schaar: Dynamic Assessments, Matching and Allocation of Tasks
Roth AE (1989) Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others’ preferences. Games and Economic
Behavior 1(2):191:209.
Shapley LS, Shubik M (1971) The assignment game I: The core. International Journal of game theory 1(1): 111-130.
Shimer R, Smith L (2000) Assortative matching and search. Econometrica 68(2):343-369.
Tran-Thanh L, Stein Sm Rogers Am Jennings NR (2012) Efficient crowdsourcing of unknown experts using bounded
multi-armed bandits. Artificial Intelligence 214:89-111.
Xiao Y, Dorfler F, Van der Schaar M (2016) Incentive design in peer review: Rating and repeated endogenous matching.
accepted and to appear in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering.
van der Schaar M, Xiao Y, Zame W (2016) Endogenous matching in a dynamic assignment model with adverse
selection and moral hazard. submitted.
